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MAJOR PROFESSOR:  Dr. Benjamin Rodriguez 
 
Although public speaking anxiety is one of the most commonly reported causes of 
both clinical and non-clinical anxiety, many of the currently used questionnaire measures 
of public speaking anxiety do not reflect the advances made in recent decades regarding 
empirical methods of test construction, including item generation and determination of 
subscale composition. The current study administered 35 empirically-generated cognitive 
self-statement items related to speaking anxiety to a sample of 367 undergraduate 
students along with measures of public speaking anxiety, fear of negative evaluation, 
generalized social anxiety behaviors, and self-consciousness tendencies. Using 
exploratory factor analysis and item-total correlations, participant responses to the 35 
self-statement items were examined, producing the 30-item Speaking Cognitions and 
Attention Scale (SCAS). Data indicated that in the current sample the SCAS displayed a 
three-factor solution, with factors composed of items reflecting positive self-statements, 
negative self-statements, and catastrophic self-statements. The scale also demonstrated 
excellent internal reliability, with alphas in the range of .90 to .97. Discriminant validity 
analyses supported the specificity of the measure in measuring public speaking anxiety 
by correlating highly with another measure of speaking anxiety, at a moderate level with 
measures of general social anxiety, and at a small level with a measure of self-
consciousness with no theoretical relationship to speaking anxiety. Results are discussed 
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with respect to implications of the current findings for questionnaire measurement of 
public speaking anxiety, needed future directions in further validation of the measure, and 
potential applications for treatment of public speaking anxiety.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Social performance situations, such as meeting a stranger for the first time or 
speaking before a group of people, arouse subjective experiences of anxiety in many 
individuals. The National Comorbidity Survey, a large scale epidemiological survey 
focusing on mental health issues, found that 38.6% of the sample reported experiencing 
some sort of social fear; of that number, 34.5% met criteria for a DSM-III-R diagnosis of 
social phobia, a disorder in which social fears cause clinically significant distress and 
behavioral avoidance (Kessler, Stein, & Berglund, 1998). Hofmann and Barlow (2004) 
note that social phobia is the most common anxiety disorder and the third most common 
mental health complaint in the general population. Social and performance anxiety can be 
aroused by a variety of social situations, with wide variation between sufferers in regards 
to which scenarios are most distressing. One of the most consistently reported anxiety- 
producing situations is public speaking, which can arouse strong anxious responding even 
in individuals who experience little or no anxiety in other social interactions (Pollard & 
Henderson, 1988). A randomized survey of 499 subjects about public speaking fears 
found that one-third of respondents reported being “much more nervous than other 
people” while speaking to an audience (Stein, Walker, & Forde, 1996), a figure which 
closely matches the 30.2% lifetime prevalence rate of public speaking anxiety reported 
by the National Comorbidity Survey (Kessler, Stein, & Berglund, 1998). 
Public speaking anxiety is classified by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 4
th
 edition (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) as a 
type of specific social phobia. Specific social phobias are distinguished from generalized 
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social phobia by considering the pervasiveness of the situation that arouses the anxious 
responses. Individuals with generalized social phobia will experience cognitive and 
physiological indicators of anxiety and exhibit behavioral avoidance tendencies in 
response to a broad spectrum of social interaction and performance situations, while 
individuals with specific social phobia will display this pattern only in a narrow subset of 
social situations and function without marked distress in all others. Public speaking 
anxiety, therefore, has been commonly operationalized (Kessler, Stein, & Berglund, 
1998) as the regular experience of extreme discomfort during, or avoidance of, social 
performance situations in which the individual is the subject of scrutiny by multiple 
others who are primarily passive observers or evaluators rather than active interactional 
participants.  
This general construct has also been studied intensively by speech communication 
researchers, who conceptualize it under a general class of behavioral phenomena labeled 
communication apprehension. McCroskey (1977) defines communication apprehension 
as “an individual‟s level of fear or anxiety associated with either real or anticipated 
communication with another person or persons” (p. 78). Considered as such, this 
definition overlaps with the one offered above by empirical psychology in identifying 
cognitively-experienced anxiety as the cause of social difficulties, but differs in 
identifying more broadly defined concerns about communication as the sole source of 
this anxiety, rather than also incorporating differences related to situational aspects. 
However, McCroskey (1977) does acknowledge variation in experiences of 
communication apprehension, particularly the existence of specifically public-speaking 
focused apprehension, and researchers investigating communication apprehension (e.g. 
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Beatty & Behnke, 1991; Boohar & Seiler, 1982; Burgoon & LePoire, 1993; Greene & 
Sparks, 1983) have been diligent in operationalizing the contexts in which they have 
chosen to examine the construct. Therefore, enough points of comparison exist between 
the psychological and communication constructions that research in either field can be 
considered informative to the theoretical foundations of the other. The current review will 
seek primarily to consider communication apprehension findings within the context of 
the psychological literature on public speaking and social anxiety in general.  
 Although public speaking anxiety is common, it can carry insidious 
consequences. As noted above, moderate or severe levels of social and performance 
anxiety are typically accompanied by attempts to avoid the feared social situation 
(Hofmann & Barlow, 2004; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). When the focus of anxiety is 
public speaking, such avoidance tendencies can be significant barriers to educational and 
occupational attainment, as speeches and public presentations have become increasingly 
common elements of college curricula and many middle-class occupations. Rodebaugh 
and Chambless (2004) provide a prototypical example in discussing the treatment of a 
speech-anxious client whose symptoms were causing him to avoid pursuing a graduate 
education because of the likelihood that he would be required to make public 
presentations.  
Empirical evidence indicates that this state of affairs is far from uncommon for 
those who suffer from public speaking anxiety. Among speech-anxious respondents to 
the survey conducted by Stein, Walker, and Forde (1996), 17% reported that their speech 
anxiety had an adverse effect on their educational, occupational, or social functioning. A 
review by McCroskey (1977) on the educational effects of communication apprehension 
4 
 
  
 
notes that students reporting high levels of communication apprehension frequently 
report lower grade point averages and scores on standardized testing, suggesting that 
communication fears may constitute a significant impediment to learning while in school. 
Supporting this assertion, Boohar and Seiler (1982) found that students in an 
undergraduate bioethics course who scored highly on a measure of communication 
apprehension received lower grades on exams and term papers and were less likely to 
consult with the instructor during available office hours. The authors posited that 
apprehension or anxiety about verbal communication, along with reducing learning, may 
cause instructors to take a more negative view of a student‟s motivation to achieve or 
master the material. When one considers such findings in the light of the high prevalence 
of public speaking anxiety, it becomes clear that its deleterious effects can reach far 
beyond the experience at the podium. 
 Fortunately, public speaking anxiety is a condition that has proven to be highly 
amenable to explanation and treatment. As a form of specific social anxiety (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994), public speaking anxiety can be understood using current 
explanatory theoretical models of social phobia (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997), which emphasize the interaction between internal cognitive factors and 
overt behavioral elements in creating and sustaining the anxious response. These 
cognitive-behavioral models, designed to prevent a flexible description of anxiety 
processes, are thought to generalize even to instances of subclinical anxiety (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). Accompanying these advances in theoretical formulation, social 
anxiety treatment has become both more effective and more efficient (Bitran & Barlow, 
2004; Hofmann & Barlow, 2004; Rodebaugh & Chambless, 2004). Short-term treatment 
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that focuses on cognitively-based interpretations and controlled behavioral exposure to 
feared situations now represents the gold standard for treatment of social and 
performance anxiety (Bitran & Barlow, 2004), even supplanting pharmacotherapy, which 
may actively interfere with the extinction of the behavioral response (Birk, 2004).  
 Despite the substantial gains discussed above, there is still room for improvement 
in the theoretical and clinical literature on public speaking anxiety. In large part, such 
improvements will take the form of refining the existing theoretical framework and 
treatment to better incorporate specific idiographic features that differentiate between the 
various subtypes of social and performance anxiety. A key first step toward 
accomplishing this is the formulation of measures specifically targeted towards assessing 
such subtypes using empirically derived and externally valid methods. The development 
of reliable and valid measures of specific subtypes of social anxiety that possess strong 
discriminant and construct validity will allow for more targeted assessment and will 
consequently open the door to more focused and individualized treatment.  
 The current research aims to develop and validate a self-report measure 
specifically designed to assess public speaking anxiety. Existing measures of public 
speaking anxiety (e.g. Hofmann & DiBartolo, 2000; Paul, 1966) suffer from limitations 
that result from not having been developed using empirical methods of item generation or 
not having been specifically developed to measure anxiety about public speaking. The 
current study attempts to avoid these faults by employing an empirically-based and 
naturalistic method of item generation known as the thought-listing method (Cacioppo, 
Glass, & Merluzzi, 1979; Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997) in which scale items are 
distilled from actual thoughts experienced by speech-anxious individuals engaged in a 
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public speaking task. Another shortcoming of existing self-report assessments of public 
speaking anxiety is that most assess only the positive or negative emotional experiences 
(hereafter referred to using the term “affective valence”) associated with public speaking. 
However, a growing body of empirical and theoretical work examining the effects of 
focusing attention toward the self or toward other people during a social encounter (e.g. 
Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Woody, 1996; Woody 
& Rodriguez, 2000) suggests that assessing affective valence alone without considering 
focus of attention might provide an incomplete picture of speaking anxiety. The public 
speaking anxiety measure to be developed and validated by this study will address this by 
explicitly including an attentional focus component.  The ultimate goal of the current 
study is to use empirical methods to validate a self-report measure of public speaking 
anxiety that is grounded in the current empirical and theoretical literature on the subject 
and to obtain preliminary psychometric data on the reliability, validity, and factor 
structure of this measure.  
Understanding Public Speaking Anxiety 
The Contribution of Cognitive Theory 
 Over the past several decades, cognitive theory has maintained a position of 
widespread influence in conceptualizations of maladaptive or distressing mental 
conditions, including anxiety (e.g. Beck & Clark, 1997; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 
1985; Bruch, Mattia, Heimberg, & Holt, 1993; Heimberg, Dodge, Hope, Kennedy, Zollo 
& Becker, 1990). According to Beck (1976), the central innovation of cognitive theory is 
the idea that thoughts and thought processes exert a great degree of influence over 
behaviors and emotions. By extension, distressing or maladaptive behaviors and emotions 
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can be linked to specific thoughts. Cognitive therapy seeks to alleviate mental distress by 
changing or reinterpreting such thoughts (Beck, 1976). 
 Of particular importance in cognitive theory are “automatic thoughts,” or 
emotion-eliciting thoughts that occur outside of the individual‟s conscious control. Beck 
(1976) describes automatic thoughts as interpretations of events which are regarded as 
plausible or likely by the individual but are actually not based in fact. In many cases, 
automatic thoughts take the form of a statement regarding the individual‟s ability to cope 
effectively with the situation at hand and the implications of success or failure in doing so 
(Beck, 1976). These self-relevant automatic thoughts are commonly referred to as self-
statements (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995).  
 With regard to the anxiety disorders, cognitive theory theorizes that specific self-
statements and other automatic thoughts cause the individual to feel that he or she is in 
some sort of danger (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Ingram & Kendall, 1987), which 
in turn activates the constellation of physiological and affective arousal reactions that 
comprise the anxiety response (Beck & Clark, 1997). Research into self-statements has 
therefore been of particular interest to investigators seeking to provide empirical support 
for this model. Since social anxiety research has consistently found that highly socially 
anxious individuals under-rate their social performance relative to observer ratings 
(Alden & Wallace, 1995; Rapee & Lim, 1992; Rodebaugh & Rapee, 2005; Stopa & 
Clark, 1993; Wallace & Alden, 1991), most research into the role of self-statements in 
social anxiety has focused on the hypothesis that negative statements about one‟s social 
self-efficacy perpetuate socially anxious responding.  
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 Harrell, Chambless, and Calhoun (1981) examined the correlational relationship 
between self-statements and affect by presenting undergraduate participants with a series 
of hypothetical situations involving interpersonal conflict, such as being criticized or 
rejected by another person. After reading each situation, the participants were instructed 
to rate a series of prototypical self-statements designed to express anger, anxiety, 
suspicion, depression, or rational responding, in terms of how likely they would be to 
express that self-statement in response to the situation. Additionally, participants were 
provided with a list of five affective states that reflected the same categories of anger, 
anxiety, suspiciousness, depression, and rationality. The results of the study indicated 
that, as hypothesized, the specific self-statements were highly correlated with their 
corresponding affective states. Additionally, individuals who rated the anxious self-
statements as being more characteristic of them received higher scores on the Fear of 
Negative Evaluation Scale and the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (Watson & 
Friend, 1969), both of which are measures of social anxiety. Finally, the self-statements 
designated as “rational” by the researchers exhibited an inverse association with the 
affective states designated as “maladaptive” (anger, anxiety, suspiciousness, and 
depression). Despite the methodological shortcomings resulting from the study being 
correlational in nature and not employing any behavioral measures, these results are 
consistent with the cognitive model‟s claims (Beck, 1976; Ingram & Kendall, 1987) that 
self-statements and affective states relate closely to one another.  
 Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, and Dombeck (1990) utilized a more experimentally-
based approach to the study of negative self-statements in social anxiety. These 
researchers modified the classic Stroop color naming task using words as stimuli. The 
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stimulus words were chosen to reflect social anxiety-related themes of failure and 
inadequacy or panic disorder-related themes of physical illness and somatic 
dysregulation. Emotionally neutral words were also included as controls. A sample of 
socially phobic and panic-disordered individuals were exposed to these words and asked 
to identify the color of the ink that each was written in. Consistent with hypotheses, 
results indicated that socially phobic individuals exhibited greater response latencies on 
social threat words than for physical threat words or neutral words; while panic-
disordered individuals exhibited greater response latencies when physical threat words 
were presented as compared to the other two categories. This pattern of results suggests 
that socially-phobic individuals may process information in a manner that is biased 
toward social stimuli which carry negative or threatening connotations, which is 
consistent with the predictions of cognitive theory (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). 
 Mahone, Bruch, and Heimberg (1993) conducted a study in which undergraduate 
men engaged in a brief interaction with a female confederate. As the subjects awaited the 
interaction, they were asked to make separate listings of thoughts they were having about 
themselves (self-statements) and thoughts they were having about their interaction 
partner. Subjects also provided ratings of their subjective feelings of anxiety and their 
self-efficacy in regards to making a favorable impression on their interaction partner. 
Results indicated that the percentage of reported negative self-statements was inversely 
related to social self-efficacy and positively related to subjective anxiety during the 
interaction. Percentage of negative self-statements was also a significant predictor of 
scores on the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969). The results 
of this study provide more empirical support for the cognitive model‟s assertion that 
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negative self-statements in social situations are a key component of social anxiety (Beck, 
1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). 
 In a replication and expansion of Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg‟s (1993) study, 
Beazley, Glass, Chambless, & Arnkoff (2001) measured self-statements in social phobics 
across three different types of social situations. Participants reported self-statements in 
connection with an interaction with a partner of the same sex, an interaction with an 
opposite-sex partner, and a public speaking situation. Results indicated that the situation 
exhibited a significant effect on the associated pattern of cognitions, particularly when 
the interaction situations were compared to the public speaking situation. Social phobics 
reported more negative thoughts and fewer positive thoughts in the public speaking 
situation than in the interaction scenarios. Additionally, negative self-statements were 
found to correlate highly with participant self-ratings of poor social skill and observer 
ratings of higher anxiety and poorer social skill. Based on these findings, the authors 
recommend that more attention be paid to the effects of specific social situations on 
eliciting anxiety, and recommended that a wider variety of behavioral situations be 
employed to study generalized social phobia experimentally. 
 A critical prediction of cognitive theory is that anxiety problems can be 
successfully treated by changing their associated negative self-statements (Beck, 1976; 
Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). Chambless, Tran, and Glass (1997) examined 
predictors of response to a group-based cognitive-behavioral treatment for social phobia. 
After completing a course of this treatment, participants completed a variety of 
questionnaire-based measures along with behavioral tasks such as giving a public speech 
and interacting with an experimental confederate. Results indicated that cognitive 
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changes involving decreased negative thinking during social behavior were associated 
with decreases in self-reported anxiety in both public speaking and dyadic interactions 
immediately after the end of treatment. However, the research hypothesis that cognitive 
changes would predict maintenance of treatment gains at a 6 month follow-up evaluation 
was not supported, lending only mixed support to the predictions of cognitive theory.  
 Ayers (1988), approaching the problem of speaking anxiety from a 
communication apprehension framework, also noted correlational evidence linking public 
speaking anxiety to negative expectations before giving a speech and negative 
evaluations afterwards. He applied these findings to an experimental paradigm in which 
half of a population of students enrolled in an undergraduate public speaking class were 
trained in the use of a visualization technique involving a combination of relaxation, 
imaginal exposure and positive thinking to prepare for a speech. In comparison to a 
control group of students that did not receive training in this method, speakers using this 
technique reported less anxiety while speaking and a greater proportion of self-reported 
positive thoughts during the speaking task. These findings appear to support the assertion 
of cognitive theory that interventions targeted toward increasing positive thoughts about 
public speaking can yield measurable reductions in anxiety.  
In another experimental investigation of cognitive change, Heimberg, Dodge, 
Hope, Kennedy, Zollo, and Becker (1990) compared two varieties of group treatment for 
social phobia. The first of these was grounded in cognitive theory and taught subjects to 
identify, analyze, and challenge their social anxiety-related automatic thoughts, while 
emphasizing the need for practicing these skills in real-life social situations. The second 
group, which served as a control, was psychoeducational in nature and focused on 
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providing definitions and demonstrations of social phobia concepts, as well as supportive 
group discussions. All subjects participated in a simulated social scenario, which was 
personalized for each individual in order to increase the likelihood that it would be 
anxiety-provoking, after the conclusion of the treatment and at 3- and 6- month follow-
up. Subjects were assessed on a variety of measures of anxiety, including a self-report 
listing measure of self-statements experienced during the task.  
Data analysis indicated that the group receiving the cognitive treatment exhibited 
greater reductions in self-reported and observer-rated anxiety in comparison to the 
control treatment, and that these gains were more likely to be preserved throughout the 
follow-up period. Furthermore, the patients in the cognitive condition showed greater 
change in reported negative and positive self-statements between pretest and follow-up, 
indicating that the observed gains were likely related to changes in patterns of cognition. 
A five-year follow-up study (Heimberg, Salzman, Hope, & Blendell, 1993) with the same 
sample found that the cognitive condition participants continued to display and report less 
anxiety than their counterparts in the control cohort. By demonstrating via a controlled 
study that cognitive changes appear to lead to changes in anxiety, this data provides 
further  support for the cognitive theory of anxiety (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; 
Ingram & Kendall, 1987) and its efficacy in predicting and altering socially anxious 
responding. 
A Theoretical Account of Behavioral Regulation 
 The previously reviewed research suggests that the cognitive model lends a valid 
and important perspective on social anxiety. The basic claims of the cognitive model, 
most notably the importance of cognitions and subjective interpretations in determining 
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behavioral responses, have had wide influence in the theoretical and empirical literature 
on social anxiety (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995; Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982; 
Ingram & Kendall, 1987; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 
1993), as well as in other areas. One formulation which has been profoundly influenced 
by the cognitive model is self-regulation theory (Carver & Scheier, 1981; 1998), a 
general model of behavior that forms the basis for the explanatory model of social 
anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995) upon which this study is based. 
 As described by Carver and Scheier (1998), self-regulation theory is designed to 
function as a high-level explanatory framework for motivated behavior. The theory is 
particularly adept at generating complex conceptualizations which account for the 
interactions of a variety of cognitive, behavioral, environmental, and attentional features 
in determining the course of behavior. As such, the theory is intentionally broad and can 
be flexibly applied to a wide variety of specific behaviors across different contexts. 
Despite the high degree of flexibility and abstraction, the core features of self-regulation 
theory discussed below form a stable basis for a coherent model of motivated behavior. 
 Standards of behavior. Self-regulation theory postulates that all motivated 
behavior is an attempt to meet some sort of standard of comparison against which that 
behavior can be judged. Carver & Scheier (1998) term this standard the “reference 
value”, and note that this value is highly subjective. That is, reference values for a 
particular behavior will vary depending on the context in which the behavior is 
performed, the idiographic characteristics of the individual performing the behavior, and 
the degree to which performance feedback is available. However, all reference values 
serve the same basic function: providing an active standard against which the individual 
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regulates his or her behavior. As such, self-regulation theory proposes that the various 
elements involved in behavior regulation exist to ensure that the performed behavior 
measures up to the corresponding active reference value. Self-regulation theory‟s 
emphasis on the power of idiosyncratic and subjectively held values to influence 
behavioral responses is highly congruent with cognitive theory‟s own claims about the 
relationship between subjective cognitive interpretations and behavior (Beck, 1976; 
Ingram & Kendall, 1987). 
  Wallace and Alden (1991) investigated the influence of standards on social 
anxiety with an experimental paradigm that required controls and socially anxious 
participants to converse with an opposite-sex stranger. Prior to this task, subjects were 
asked to provide ratings of three standards of social performance relevant to the 
interaction: their personal standard for satisfaction, their perception of the experimenter‟s 
standard, and their estimate of the average standard of performance that would be 
attained by others on the task. Subjects also gave a rating of the level of performance that 
they expected to achieve in the interaction. Results indicated that the non-anxious 
subjects set their personal standards at roughly the same level as their perception of the 
experimenter‟s standards, and generally expected that they would meet or exceed all 
three standards of performance. By contrast, the anxious subjects reported personal 
standards that were lower than their perception of the experimenter‟s standards, and rated 
their abilities as being unable to match the latter standard. This pattern of results indicates 
that the discrepancy between socially anxious individuals‟ perception of their own 
abilities and their perception of the standards of others may play a key role in 
differentiating them from non-anxious individuals. 
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 Carver, Lawrence, and Scheier (1999) utilized a different approach to study the 
influence of subjective standards on affective experiences. These authors outlined three 
different types of self-perceptions to participants: the “ought-self,” defined as 
characteristics that the individual feels that he or she should possess because of moral or 
social standards, the “ideal self”, defined as characteristics that the individual would like 
to possess, and the “feared self”, defined as characteristics that the individual would like 
to avoid possessing. For each description, study participants were asked to list seven of 
their own traits which they felt to be reflective of that variety of self-perception. 
Participants then provided ratings indicating how well they felt each trait currently 
described them. The same participants were subsequently administered the Affects 
Balance Scale (Derogatis, 1975), a measure in which they were presented with a series of 
adjectives describing a variety of emotions and asked to rate the extent to which they had 
experienced each in the previous week. Results indicated that the extent to which 
participants viewed themselves as conforming or not conforming to specific self-
perceptions exhibited an effect on their affective experiences. Individuals who reported 
that they were relatively near their “feared self” also reported high levels of anxiety, guilt, 
and depression, and lower levels of happiness and contentment. Individuals who reported 
larger discrepancies between their current self and their “ideal self” similarly reported 
more feelings of depression and fewer feelings of happiness and contentment. An 
interaction effect was found for feelings of anxiety and guilt in which discrepancies 
between current self and “ought self” predicted these affective states when the individual 
did not report being close to his or her “feared self,” but did not predict them when the 
individual did make such a report. 
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 The authors interpreted this last finding as an indication that the activation of 
different reference values creates different motivations for experiences of anxiety and 
guilt. The researchers theorize that when proximity to the “feared self” is salient, the 
affective reaction serves to motivate the individual to distance him or herself from that 
state; by contrast, when the “feared self” is not salient, then the individual is more likely 
to experience anxiety and guilt as a means of motivating him or herself to reduce 
perceived discrepancies between the current self-perception and the “ought self” (Carver, 
Lawrence & Scheier, 1999). These findings and their interpretations by the authors are 
consistent with self-regulation theory‟s proposal that subjectively held standards against 
which individuals evaluate themselves are a crucial variable in the understanding of 
emotion and behavior (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Carver & Scheier, 1998). 
The speech communication literature parallels the psychological studies above in 
investigating the role of prevailing standards in communication apprehension. Greene 
and Sparks (1983) conducted a study in which groups of undergraduate students were 
asked to record an audiotape of themselves arguing their opinion on a provided topic. 
Half of the participants were informed that the quality of their arguments would be 
evaluated by trained judges, while the other half were told the arguments were simply a 
means to keep them engaged in speech while the experimenters measured their 
physiological responses to speaking and that the content of their tapes would be 
immediately erased. Results indicated that participants who scored highly on a measure 
of communication apprehension reported significantly more anxiety in the first, more 
evaluative situation than in the second, while participants who received low 
communication apprehension scores reported no differences in anxiety between the two 
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conditions. Greene and Sparks (1983) interpreted these results as indicating that the 
effects of communication apprehension vary with the extent to which the situation is 
perceived as evaluative. 
An investigation by Beatty (1988) into the situational correlates of 
communication apprehension found additional evidence to support the importance of 
evaluative standards. The results of a correlational study conducted with undergraduate 
subjects indicated that public speaking anxiety was positively predicted by the extent to 
which the speakers felt that they were dissimilar or subordinate to the audience. 
Furthermore, subjects who scored highly on a measure of communication apprehension 
were significantly more likely to report both feeling subordinate or inferior to the 
audience and being more conspicuously scrutinized by the audience. In interpreting this 
latter finding, the author emphasizes the interaction between the trait-like predisposition 
toward communication apprehension and the tendency to impute threatening or 
judgmental characteristics to audiences; an observation which corresponds well to the 
predictions of Carver and Scheier (1981).    
 Importance of feedback. In order to evaluate whether or not a behavior is 
congruent with the current reference value, current measures of performance must be 
taken. One of the most critical tenets of self-regulation theory is that motivation and 
behavior are subject to constant revision based on new information, which is constantly 
being received from a variety of sources. The dynamic nature of self-regulation models 
leads to great emphasis being placed on feedback processes. Feedback provides a value 
for current performance that can then be compared to the reference value to yield 
information about whether or not behavioral adjustment is needed. The most commonly 
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employed feedback mechanism to explain behavior in self-regulation models is negative 
feedback. Negative feedback occurs when a discrepancy exists between the reference 
value and information about performance received through feedback channels. When 
such a discrepancy is detected, behavior changes in an attempt to reduce or eliminate this 
discrepancy and return performance to the level of the reference value (Carver & Scheier, 
1998). 
 Rodebaugh and Rapee (2005) conducted an experiment in which both socially 
anxious and non-anxious individuals gave two short videotaped speeches. In between the 
first speech and the second one, participants in the experimental condition rated how well 
they believed they performed on the previous speech, and then re-rated their performance 
after watching the videotape of that speech. Participants in the control condition also 
rated their first speech twice, performing a filler task between ratings. For each 
participant, a discrepancy score was calculated in which the participant‟s first rating of 
his or her performance was compared to the average rating of two trained observers. 
Analysis of the data revealed an interaction effect in which participants in the 
experimental condition who displayed a markedly negative evaluation of their 
performance relative to the raters evaluated their performance on the first speech more 
positively after viewing the video. The finding that individuals who are biased towards 
evaluating their public speaking performance negatively are more likely to re-evaluate 
themselves after receiving objective feedback suggests that the nature of the feedback 
being provided can display a concrete effect on self-perception and behavior, which is 
highly consistent with the claims of self-regulation theory regarding the importance of 
feedback (Carver & Scheier, 1981). 
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 Wald (2005) utilized a similar public speaking paradigm in which participants 
gave two videotaped speeches before an audience. However, rather than utilizing the tape 
of the speech performance itself, the experimenters provided participants with feedback 
that was ostensibly from the audience but was actually standardized to provide similar 
information using different framing (wording). The feedback types were as follows: 
positive other-focused, which made explicit reference to the audience in noting a 
supposed positive attribute of the speech; positive self-focused, which referred to the 
participant‟s actions and noted a supposed positive attribute of the speech; lack of 
negative other-focused, which also made explicit reference to the audience and noted a 
supposed avoidance of a negative behavior during the speech; and lack of negative self-
focused, which referred only to the participants actions in noting a supposed avoidance of 
a negative attribute. The author also employed a control condition in which no feedback 
was provided. Results indicated that the presence of feedback in any form was associated 
with better predicted performance in the second speech relative to the control 
participants. Additionally, a differential effect for the feedback frames was noted, in 
which over all conditions, self-focused positive feedback was associated with the greatest 
amount of experienced anxiety in the second speech and positive other-focused feedback 
was associated with the least amount. These findings provide more evidence in support of 
the influence of feedback on behavior as per self-regulation theory. 
 Goals. Goals constitute one of the most common sources of reference values for 
behavior. Self-regulation theory holds that all behaviors are essentially attempts to either 
achieve a desired outcome or avoid an undesired outcome. Goals represent the 
individual‟s explicit identification of what should be accomplished by a particular 
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behavior. The relationship between goals and behavior can be complex; goals are often 
nested within extensive hierarchies, with high-order, abstract goals (such as “be a good 
person”) subsuming lower-order, more concrete goals (such as “do not deceive your 
significant other”). The hierarchical organization of goals in such a manner suggests that 
the operating reference value in a behavior regulation loop may change in accordance 
with changes in the current importance of different goals. If, for example, the situation 
activates a lower-order goal in the hierarchy, such as “do not deceive your significant 
other”, the resulting regulation of behavior against this standard will take a markedly 
different form than if a higher-order goal is activated, such as “be a good person,” despite 
the fact that both goals are in the same hierarchy (Carver & Scheier, 1998).   
 Empirical research tends to support the importance of goals in behavior regulation 
as it relates to social anxiety, although findings have indicated that perceived efficacy in 
achieving goals tends to be a stronger predictor of anxious behavior than the goals 
themselves. In their study of standard setting in social interactions, Wallace and Alden 
(1991) noted that anxious participants did not differ from non-anxious individuals in 
ratings of their personal standards of performance for the interaction, but did rate 
themselves as being less efficacious in achieving these goals. Kocovski and Endler 
(2000) administered a battery of measures assessing social anxiety, goal-directed 
behavior, and related constructs to university undergraduates. Results indicated that 
individuals reporting greater social anxiety also reported lower expectations of goal 
achievement. Although this data is correlational in nature and therefore limited by the 
inability to infer a causal relationship between the variables, the authors hypothesized 
that socially anxious individuals may develop lower expectations of goal achievement as 
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a defense mechanism against anxiety associated with perceptions that they are likely to 
fail to achieve their goals. 
  Affect. Self-regulation theories also recognize that many behaviors are 
accompanied by emotional experiences. The affective component that accompanies goal-
directed behavior can often be quite strong, particularly in situations that are likely to 
arouse anxiety. Carver and Scheier (1998) theorize that emotion is linked to a separate 
but related higher-level function in the self-regulation system that monitors the 
individual‟s progress in reducing discrepancies between current behavioral output and the 
active reference value. In terms of this conceptualization, the critical concern is the 
effectiveness of the self-regulation system as expressed by the rate of discrepancy 
reduction. Affective experiences constitute a feedback channel providing this 
information, with the rate of discrepancy reduction being compared to a value 
representing the expected or ideal rate of reduction. When the current rate of reduction is 
less than expected or when the discrepancy is perceived to be widening, negative affect 
results.  When the progress in reducing discrepancy is greater than expected, the affective 
experience is positive. In situations where the perceived rate of progress matches the 
expected rate, no emotional experience is predicted. Carver and Scheier (1998) 
emphasize that affect is tied to progress or regress in the process of goal attainment, not 
the actual attainment of goals.  
 Carver (2006) extends this conceptualization of the role of affect in self-
regulation in a new direction by postulating the existence of two distinct broadly-defined 
types of affect-behavior relationships. These are, respectively, affects linked to 
approaching desired goals and affects linked to avoiding undesired goals. Notably, both 
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varieties are conceptualized as bipolar dimensions, with the potential to produce either 
positive or negative emotion. For instance, approach-related affects could be negative if 
goals are not being achieved, and avoidance-related affects could be positive if attempts 
to avoid undesirable outcomes are met with success. Carver (2004) found empirical 
support for this theory using scales designed to assess both approach and avoidance 
tendencies. Despite the fact that the items designed to measure approach tendencies 
contained no reference to negative affect or threat, it was found that experimentally 
manipulated situations designed to produce negative emotional experiences of sadness, 
frustration, and anger through thwarting of goal-directed behavior were positively related 
to approach tendencies. Negative emotional experiences of anxiety and fear produced by 
situations in which participants were exposed to undesirable outcomes were positively 
related to avoidance tendencies. Both results are consistent with the theorized existence 
of two independent bipolar dimensions of affect, linked to approach and avoidance 
tendencies. 
Focus of Attention in Behavioral Self-Regulation and Social Anxiety 
 Perhaps the most relevant contribution of self-regulation theory (Carver & 
Scheier, 1981; 1998) toward understanding socially anxious behavior is the heavy 
emphasis on the behavioral effects of focus of attention. Since self-regulation theory 
postulates that behavior is greatly affected by the context in which it takes place, 
attentional factors are incorporated into several facets of the theory to explain how some 
features of the environment become more relevant to a particular behavior than others. 
Self-regulation models distinguish between goals which are essentially private and those 
that are essentially public (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Private goals deal mainly with 
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internal phenomena such as thoughts, desires, and self-related motivations, while public 
goals are typically more concerned with issues of self-presentation in social situations. 
Whether public or private goals are focused upon as the reference value for a particular 
behavior depends on the situational context.  Focusing on private goals tends to amplify 
awareness of personally held values, while activation of public goals causes the 
individual to conceptualize himself or herself as the object of others‟ perceptions. As with 
any variation in reference values, activation of private versus public goals by a particular 
situation changes the subsequent process of behavioral regulation. For instance, social 
interactions and the anticipation of social interactions seem to cause public goals to be 
activated, resulting in the adoption of a reference value that represents the expectations, 
as the individual perceives them, of others in the social environment. The individual will 
then evaluate the effectiveness of his or her subsequent behavior in the situation against 
these norms, with the intent of minimizing discrepancies (Carver & Scheier, 1998). 
 Focusing attention on the self as compared to focusing on the environment seems 
to be of particular importance in determining whether public or private goals are 
activated in a given situation (Carver & Scheier, 1981). In particular, self-regulation 
theory predicts that focusing attention toward the self increases the likelihood that public 
goals such as self-presentation will be adopted as the reference value for the subsequent 
behavior, with a corresponding tendency to engage in social comparison. Additionally, 
self-focus is thought to cause the individual to become more sensitive to feedback that 
indicates discrepancies with the social standards that serve as reference values, leading to 
increased attempts at behavioral regulation and more vigilant monitoring of feedback 
cues to determine the effectiveness of regulation. Experimental evidence has generally 
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supported these assertions. Scheier and Carver (1983) demonstrated this tendency by 
subjecting participants to a task in which they copied geometric figures from a reference 
drawing. Participants performing the task under a situational manipulation designed to 
increase self-focused attention looked at the reference figure more often than those in a 
control condition. Subjects who scored highly on a measure of dispositional tendencies 
toward self-consciousness similarly consulted the reference figure more often than 
subjects with lower scores on the same measure.  
 The ability of self-focused attention to engage social comparison in individuals 
has become an area of great interest in the empirical study of social anxiety processes 
(e.g. Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993; Melchior & Cheek, 1990; Monfries & Kafer, 
1994; Pilkonis, 1977; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000). Consistent with the 
predictions of self-regulation theory, self-focused attention has been repeatedly 
associated with increased social anxiety. A meta-analysis by Mor and Winquist (2002) 
encompassing 226 effect sizes found that self-focus was broadly related to negative affect 
and that self-focus on public goals was strongly related to social anxiety. Moreover, the 
analysis indicated that self-focus on private goals (rumination), although strongly 
associated with measures of depression, was only weakly related with social anxiety, 
supporting the notion that the relationship between public self-focus and social anxiety 
possesses some measure of specificity.  
 Several correlational studies have measured the relationship between social 
anxiety and self-consciousness, defined as a dispositional tendency to focus on the self 
(Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes, 1978). Pilkonis (1977) administered the Self-
Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), along with a battery of 
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measures of personality and social anxiety, to a sample of university undergraduates. He 
found that measures of general shyness, social anxiety, and self-monitoring were 
positively correlated with public self-consciousness. Additionally, individuals who 
reported a greater concern with public aspects of shyness, such as awkwardness and 
performance deficits, reported greater difficulty in coping with social anxiety than 
individuals who primarily reported concern with private aspects of shyness, such as 
subjective discomfort. Turner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes (1978) provide additional 
support by replicating Pilkonis‟s (1977) correlations between public self-consciousness 
and measures of social anxiety and self-monitoring. 
 Monfries & Kafer (1994) conducted a study correlating self-consciousness with a 
scale designed to measure fear of negative evaluation (Watson & Friend, 1969), a 
construct which has been widely linked to social anxiety both empirically and 
theoretically (e.g. Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Lim, 
1992; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Stopa & Clark, 1993) and a scale designed to measure 
more behavioral tendencies toward social anxiety (Watson & Friend, 1969). Results 
indicated that public self-consciousness correlated positively with both measures, 
providing additional support for the involvement of this construct in social anxiety. 
Interestingly, private self-consciousness was found to correlate positively with fear of 
negative evaluation but was unrelated to socially anxious behavior. The authors suggest 
that this latter finding indicates that self-consciousness over private aspects of social 
interaction may activate cognitively-based correlates of social anxiety, such as fears of 
criticism, while allowing the individual to avoid the behavioral features of social anxiety 
that are associated with greater difficulties in social situations. These findings and 
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subsequent interpretation are highly congruent with those reported by Pilkonis (1977) and 
Turner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes (1978). 
 A variety of experimental and quasi-experimental studies also support the 
association between self-focused attention and socially anxious behavior. Melchior and 
Cheek (1990) subjected shy and non-shy female participants to a five minute interaction 
with a stranger. After the interaction, participants provided an estimate of how much (in 
percentage) of the conversation period they spent focusing on themselves as compared to 
focusing on their partner. Participants also rated both themselves and their partners on 
self-consciousness, awkwardness, inhibition, confidence, and relaxedness during the 
interaction and completed a questionnaire measure of socially anxious thoughts. Subjects 
who reported spending a greater percentage of the interaction self-focusing also reported 
more shyness and shyness-related feelings during the interaction and scored more highly 
on the measure of socially anxious thoughts. Additionally, when a shy and non-shy 
individual were paired with one another, the shy individuals tended to over-rate their 
shyness relative to their partner‟s rating of them, and both individuals tended to rate the 
shy individual as exerting less influence on the direction of the conversation. Again, this 
pattern of results is highly consistent with the theorized connection between self-focused 
attention and socially anxious behavior.  
 In another experimental study of attentional focus in social situations, Woody 
(1996) employed a unique paradigm which allowed for manipulation of attentional focus. 
Socially phobic individuals were asked to give two extemporaneous speeches in front of 
an audience. The participants completed the task in pairs, with one participant speaking 
and the other standing passively beside the speaker. In both speeches, the speaker was 
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instructed to speak about the cognitive, emotional, and physical experience of standing 
before an audience, however, the focus of the speech shifted between trials. In one trial, 
the speaker described his or her own experience; in the other, the speaker described the 
experience of his or her passive partner. The change in speech focus, which served as the 
independent variable, was intended to manipulate focus of attention. Results indicated 
that when the content of the speech was focused on the passive participants, they reported 
anticipating and experiencing more anxiety and were rated by observers as appearing 
more anxious. Similarly, the speakers reported more anticipatory anxiety and were rated 
as appearing more anxious by observers when the speech content was focused on them. 
However, focus of attention was not found to affect either self-reported or audience rated 
measures of social performance, such as social skill or quality of the speech. By 
demonstrating that manipulating focus of attention can produce corresponding changes in 
subjective anxiety, Woody‟s (1996) study provides an important measure of support for 
the connection between self-focus and social anxiety. 
 In an extension of Woody‟s (1996) research paradigm, Woody and Rodriguez 
(2000) instructed participants with social phobia and non-phobic controls to give two 
extemporaneous speeches before a small audience. The task was again completed in 
pairs, with one speaker and one passive participant. As in the prior study, focus of 
attention was manipulated by changing the target of the speech content between the 
speaker and the passive participant. Analysis of the results again revealed that 
participants in both roles reported significantly greater anxiety when the content of the 
speech was focused on them. Observer ratings confirmed that participants also appeared 
more nervous in these conditions. Interestingly, the anxiety-increasing effect of self-
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focused attention occurred in both normal controls and socially phobic individuals, 
suggesting that the relationship between attentional focus and anxiety response is not 
particular to the highly anxious. The latter interpretation led the authors to theorize that 
more pathological forms of social anxiety may be linked to greater individual tendencies 
toward self-focus.  
 Woody, Chambless, and Glass (1997) employed a sample of individuals 
undergoing treatment for social phobia to investigate potential effects on self-focused 
attention. Results indicated that participant tendencies to self-focus decreased 
significantly over the course of the treatment, while tendencies to focus attention on 
external factors remained stable. Using a variety of behavioral measures administered 
both pre and post-treatment, which included dyadic interactions and public speaking, the 
authors found that decreases in reported anxiety on these measures corresponded with 
decreased self-focus. This effect was particularly pronounced among individuals with 
public speaking phobias, who reported greater improvements in their speaking anxiety 
with reductions in self-focus. These results provide more empirical support for the role of 
self-focus in social anxiety, along with indications that lessening self-focus yields 
tangible reductions in anxiety and may constitute an important target for treatment.  
 In another empirical study of the role of self-focused attention in social anxiety, 
Pineles and Mineka (2005) compared the responses of socially anxious participants to 
non-anxious participants on a dot-probe task designed to measure reaction time to various 
stimuli. In order to measure attention toward physiological cues, participants were asked 
to wear a finger plethysmograph and told that a static visual representation of their 
current heart rate would appear periodically on the screen alongside a similar visual 
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representation of the sound of a horse neighing. The authors utilized this manipulation 
with the rationale that attending to internal cues such as physiological indicators of 
anxiety constitutes a variety of self-focus, as has been suggested by several cognitive-
behavioral models of social anxiety (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997). Results indicated a significant effect for the socially anxious individuals 
preferentially attending to the stimuli that ostensibly represented their heart rate. This 
finding is consistent with Woody and Rodriguez‟s (2000) hypothesis that socially-
anxious individuals may have a dispositional tendency toward greater self-focus, 
particularly because a significant difference between socially anxious and non-anxious 
individuals emerged in the Pineles and Mineka (2005) study despite the fact that the 
experimental task did not involve a social situation. 
 In addition to the variety of research findings supporting the role of self-focused 
attention on social anxiety, empirical studies have also examined the ways in which 
attention directed towards others can promote anxiety in social situations. In their study 
of heterosocial anxiety, Mahone, Bruch, and Heimberg (1993) collected two separate 
thought-listing protocols from the undergraduate men that comprised their sample. One 
of these protocols instructed the participants to list thoughts they had about themselves 
during the interaction, while the other requested a list of thoughts about the interaction 
partner. Each list of thoughts was rated for affective valence (positive, negative, or 
neutral) by trained raters. Trained raters also viewed a videotape of each interaction in 
order to evaluate each subject for behavioral indicators of social anxiety as defined by a 
standardized protocol. Analyses indicated that positive thoughts about the interaction 
partner were a significant predictor of independently-rated behavioral indicators of social 
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anxiety. This relationship remained significant even after statistically controlling for 
variance associated with the participants‟ negative and positive self-thoughts. The authors 
interpret this result by reasoning that focusing attention on the positive qualities of the 
partner might increase the reference value for success in the interaction to a level that a 
socially anxious individual might feel less capable of matching. Although the causal 
claim made by this interpretation requires controlled experimental study for validation, 
the implication that increasing the salience of other-related standards of performance may 
promote socially anxious behavior is consistent with much of the research on the 
importance of reference values in social anxiety (e.g. Carver, Lawrence, & Scheier, 1999; 
Wallace & Alden, 1991).  
A Self-Regulation Model of Social and Performance Anxiety 
 As reviewed above, the theoretical account of behavioral regulation presented by 
self-regulation models (Carver & Scheier, 1981; 1998) displays a high degree of fit with 
existing research on social anxiety, as do the broader principles of cognitive theory 
(Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). This state of affairs provides an ideal 
groundwork for a specific model of social anxiety that incorporates the substantial 
contributions of both theories.  Indeed, several such models have been proposed (Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Ingram & Kendall, 1987; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), all of which generally 
conform to the broad framework outlined by cognitive and self-regulation theory, 
differentiating themselves from one another largely by the specific elements of the 
theories which they choose to emphasize. Of these, the model authored by Clark and 
Wells (1995) forms the foundation for the current study‟s treatment of public speaking 
anxiety. In addition to emphasizing the influence of cognitive factors in determining 
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reference values and interpreting performance feedback, this particular model offers a 
detailed elucidation of the effects of attention on anxiety and social performance. The key 
aspects of this model, how they are thought to interact with one another to account for the 
experience of social anxiety, and empirical support for these claims are summarized 
below. 
Favorable self-presentation as a reference value. Clark and Wells‟ (1995) model 
postulates that highly socially anxious individuals adopt a reference value that places a 
high priority on impression management in social situations. In many cases, these 
reference values are unrealistically high and can be expressed by statements such as “I 
must give a flawless speech” or “Any mistakes are unacceptable.”  Such reference values 
are thought to set a standard for performance that drastically increases the amount of 
pressure on the anxious individual as he or she confronts a social situation and effectively 
constitute a predisposition to a negative discrepancy between performance feedback and 
reference value. 
Noting the important role of high standards in many theoretical models of social 
anxiety, including Clark and Wells (1995), Alden, Bieling, and Wallace (1994) 
conducted an investigation into the role of perfectionism in social anxiety. Echoing the 
distinction between public and private goals outlined by self-regulation theory (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998), these researchers specified two varieties of perfectionism; socially 
prescribed, in which high standards are set by external expectations, and self-oriented, in 
which standards are set by the individual. In order to define the relationship between 
these varieties of perfectionism and socially anxious behavior, the researchers subjected 
socially anxious, mildly depressed, and control subjects to a brief interaction task with an 
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opposite-sex partner. These subjects subsequently completed measures of perfectionism 
and reported various aspects of their experience during the interaction, including 
standards for self and perceived other‟s standards.  
Results indicated that socially anxious subjects displayed a pattern of higher 
socially prescribed perfectionism and lower social self-efficacy. In comparison with the 
control and mildly depressed subjects, the socially anxious subjects exhibited a larger 
discrepancy between social self-efficacy and perceived other‟s standards. This pattern of 
results is consistent with the predictions of Clark and Wells‟ (1995) model of social 
anxiety, which emphasizes the function of discrepancies between standards and perceived 
ability to meet these standards in producing anxious responses. Of particular importance 
is the study‟s specification of public standards as the key focus of anxiety, which coheres 
with Clark and Wells‟ (1995) focus on impression management as the central goal of the 
self-regulation process as well as the previously reviewed body of empirical research 
linking public self-consciousness and other-focused behavioral standards to social 
anxiety (Pilkonis, 1977; Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes; 1978; Wallace & Alden, 
1991). 
Alden, Bieling, and Wallace‟s (1994) research supports Clark and Wells‟ (1995) 
model of social anxiety on several levels. First, it provides an empirical quantification of 
the hypothesized comparison between standards and reference values, producing results 
that closely match the model‟s predictions (Clark & Wells, 1995). Next, the observation 
that socially anxious individuals seem to differ from the non-anxious in their 
interpretation of the feasibility of meeting standards rather than the objective magnitude 
of the standards themselves provide yet another source of support for Clark and Wells‟ 
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(1995) assertion that subjective biases are of paramount importance in conceptualizing 
social anxiety. 
  Negative assumptions. Clark and Wells (1995) hypothesize that individuals who 
experience high levels of anxiety are distinguished by particular assumptions regarding 
their behavior in social situations. Specifically, such individuals may typically believe 
that they are at risk of behaving in a manner that will be deemed socially unacceptable by 
others and that this behavior will result in highly undesirable consequences. These 
beliefs, in combination with a reference value that places a strong emphasis on conveying 
a favorable impression when interacting with others, should further increase the 
likelihood that an unfavorable discrepancy will be perceived during a social situation, 
leading to negative affect and a persistent experience of anxiety. Indeed, many highly 
anxious individuals report a great deal of anxiety even when anticipating a social 
encounter that is relatively far in the future, indicating that these individuals actively 
anticipate an unfavorable discrepancy based on little more than their assumptions and 
expectations and further expect that this event will have pronounced negative 
consequences. 
 This aspect of the Clark and Wells (1995) model of social anxiety suggests that in 
comparison to non-anxious or less-anxious individuals, highly anxious individuals will 
feel more threatened by the possibility that others may evaluate them negatively. 
Empirical research has largely indicated that this is the case. Much of this research has 
employed the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969), a 
measure of cognitively-based fears of the disapproval of others. Stopa and Clark (1993) 
administered the FNE to socially anxious individuals, non-anxious controls, and 
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individuals with non-socially focused anxiety disorders following an experimental 
interaction task. Of the three groups, socially anxious individuals reported the most 
negative evaluation fears, consistent with what would be expected based on Clark and 
Wells (1995). However, the authors also noted that the non-socially anxious group scored 
more highly on the measure than did the non-anxious controls, suggesting that the scale 
measures some features of anxious pathology which are not entirely unique to social 
anxiety.  
Rapee and Lim (1992) conducted a study in which socially phobic individuals and 
non-phobic controls gave an impromptu speech before a small audience of raters, who 
evaluated each subject‟s performance and appearance of anxiety using a variety of global 
and specific criteria. Participants also provided ratings of their own speech performance 
and anxiety experience. Consistent with other research (Savitsky & Gilovich, 2003; Stopa 
& Clark, 1993), results indicated that participants with social phobia exhibited a 
significant tendency to under-rate their own performance in comparison to the ratings of 
others. The authors found that scores on the FNE were the only significant predictor of 
this self-other discrepancy, further supporting the notion that expectations of negative 
evaluation constitute a key determinant of social anxiety. 
In an investigation of the effects of communication apprehension in classroom 
settings, Booth-Butterfield (1989) conducted an experiment in which high and low-
apprehensive undergraduate students were asked to imagine that they had recently given 
a classroom speech for which they had prepared “reasonably well” and instructed to 
complete a standardized performance feedback form to reflect how they believed their 
instructor would evaluate them on such a speech, as well as providing an open-ended 
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interpretation of what that feedback would signify about their performance. Results 
indicated that both high and low-communication apprehensive individuals appeared to 
generate their evaluations using similar criteria (e.g. content, quality of delivery, amount 
of personal warmth), suggesting that communication apprehension did not fundamentally 
alter the categories that students perceived to be the components of an effective speech. 
However, high-apprehensive students estimated that they would be evaluated more 
negatively than did their low apprehensive peers on the delivery and performance aspects 
of the task, and endorsed more negative attributions in regards to the effectiveness of 
their speaking. Interestingly, results also indicated that high-apprehensive individuals 
evaluated themselves more positively on factors relating to speech content, an unexpected 
finding that led the researcher to hypothesize that high-apprehensive individuals may 
habitually put more effort into preparing the content of speeches in order to compensate 
for their perceived difficulties in delivery factors.   
  In conjunction with the assertion that socially anxious individuals are more 
concerned with being negatively evaluated by others, Clark and Wells‟ (1995) model also 
theorizes that such individuals are more inclined to view their own social performance in 
a negative light. Stopa and Clark (1993) evaluated the self-reported cognitions of socially 
anxious individuals, non-anxious controls, and individuals with non socially-related 
anxiety disorders following a social interaction task. Relative to the other two groups, 
socially anxious subjects were significantly more likely to report having negative 
thoughts about their own performance on the task.  Cacioppo, Glass, and Merluzzi (1979) 
performed a similar experiment in which socially anxious and non-anxious undergraduate 
males were asked to list their thoughts while awaiting a brief interaction with a female. 
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The socially anxious participants listed significantly more negative thoughts regarding 
their anticipated performance. Furthermore, independent judges rated the reported 
thoughts of the anxious participants as significantly different from those of the non-
anxious participants, suggesting that socially anxious functioning is characterized by 
distinctive patterns of cognition.  
Other empirical studies have also broadly supported Clark and Wells‟ (1995) 
conceptualization of socially anxious individuals holding lower expectations of their own 
social performance abilities. The previously discussed findings of Rapee and Lim (1992) 
that anxious individuals were more likely than controls to under-rate their performance 
relative to the ratings of the objective observers indicates that in addition to greater fears 
of negative evaluation, the socially anxious may tend to believe that performance 
deficiencies in social situations will cause these fears to be realized. Stopa and Clark 
(1993) observed a similar result, in which socially phobic participants were more strongly 
negative than third-party observers in rating their social performance. In their study of 
self-focused attention, Woody and Rodriguez (2000) found that socially phobic 
individuals rated their performances as less skillful than did participants in a non-phobic 
comparison group; however, objective raters in this case did not differ significantly from 
the self-ratings of the social phobics. Rather, a self-other discrepancy was observed in the 
non-phobic controls; the objective raters evaluated this group‟s performance significantly 
lower than self-ratings, suggesting a potential bias toward overestimation of performance 
efficacy in “normal” individuals.  
Although individuals with social phobia have been described in the literature as 
displaying social performance deficits (i.e. Alden & Wallace, 1995; Stopa & Clark, 
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1993), the fact that the highly anxious often view themselves even more negatively than 
objective observers serves to highlight the operation of significant negative biases. 
Furthermore, the widely reported existence of this discrepancy in the highly anxious 
indicates that a biased perspective on one‟s performance can drastically affect how a 
social encounter is approached. These observations, coupled with the previously 
reviewed research regarding the functioning of negative self-statements in social anxiety 
(Harrell, Chambless, & Calhoun, 1981; Heimberg, Dodge, Hope, Kennedy, Zollo, & 
Becker, 1990; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 
1993), fit well with the framework outlined by Clark and Wells (1995), which theorizes 
that negative performance expectations serve to accentuate the disparity between 
reference values and social performance as currently perceived. 
Self-focused attention. Consistent with the literature reviewed previously 
(Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993; Melchior & Cheek, 1990; Monfries & Kafer, 1994; 
Pilkonis, 1977; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000), Clark and Wells‟ (1995) 
model of social anxiety outlines a central role for self-focused attention in provoking 
anxious responding. Specifically, the model hypothesizes that once highly anxious 
individuals enter a social situation in which a risk of negative evaluation is perceived, 
they focus a large proportion of their attentional resources on themselves. Clark and 
Wells (1995) theorize that self-focus serves to create an internal, cognitively-based 
estimation of the individual‟s current social performance as seen by others in the 
situation, roughly equivalent to Carver and Scheier‟s (1981) conceptualization of public 
self-consciousness. This mental image is thought to function as the primary source of 
performance feedback to be comparison with the active reference value. Since this 
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conceptualization of the social self is heavily influenced by the individual‟s pre-existing 
beliefs about his or her efficacy in social situations, highly anxious individuals, who tend 
to express lower social self-efficacy (Stopa & Clark, 1993; Wallace & Alden, 1991), will 
be more likely to perceive an unfavorable discrepancy from the outset of the social 
encounter. 
This hypothesized mechanism for the relationship between self-focused attention 
and social anxiety finds some empirical support in Alden, Bieling, and Wallace‟s (1994) 
study of the influence of perfectionistic thinking in social anxiety. Their results indicated 
that frequency of self-appraisal during the interaction task was the most significant 
predictor of the socially prescribed perfectionism that constitutes a key component of 
social anxiety. Since the process of self-appraisal involves both self-focus and 
comparison processes, the construct seems to be a reasonable approximation of Clark and 
Wells‟ (1995) description of a social comparison process that becomes increasingly 
engaged with self-focus. Therefore, the finding that self-appraisal is associated with 
social anxiety seems quite consistent with this aspect of the Clark and Wells (1995) 
model.   
 Safety behaviors. Clark and Wells (1995) also theorize that behavioral aspects 
play a significant role in the course of social anxiety related self-regulation. Anxious 
individuals are thought to engage in specific preventative defensive behaviors that are 
inhibitory in nature, to attempt to guard against negative evaluation. The hypothesized 
function of these “safety behaviors” is to prevent the individual from doing something 
that he or she thinks is very likely to result in a negative evaluation, such as stammering 
or turning red. Although safety behaviors are a form of anxiety regulation, Clark and 
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Wells (1995) note that they are frequently counterproductive in actually reducing or 
eliminating social or performance anxiety. Primarily, this is because the individual‟s 
belief in the efficacy of safety behaviors in minimizing negative evaluation is thought to 
prevent the individual from receiving feedback indicating that the feared event is actually 
not as negatively evaluated by others as previously assumed. Another problem arises 
when increased vigilance toward the feared outcomes that the safety behaviors attempt to 
guard against causes those behaviors to become more likely to occur due to enhanced 
sensitivity. Clark and Wells (1995) note that this latter situation is particularly common 
when dealing with physiological processes such as trembling or blushing.  
 In an investigation of the effects of safety behaviors in interpersonal functioning, 
Alden and Bieling (1998) subjected socially anxious and non-anxious undergraduate 
women to a social interaction task with an experimental confederate. Prior to the 
interaction, each participant was given one of two instructional briefings; which 
suggested that the participant was likely to be positively appraised or negatively 
appraised, respectively, by the interaction partner. Subjects rated their own performance 
and anxiety during the interaction and completed measures reflecting their social goals 
and level of physiological arousal. In addition, the participants were rated by the 
interaction partner on the dimensions of likeability and appropriateness of responses 
during the interaction, and participant responses were timed for length and rated for level 
of intimacy by trained judges.  
Results indicated that the socially anxious individuals in the negative appraisal 
condition were significantly more likely to speak briefly and select low-intimacy topics 
of conversation than socially anxious individuals in the positive appraisal condition, 
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despite the fact that no significant differences in physiological arousal were found 
between the two socially anxious groups. The observed situational variance of the use of 
low self-disclosure and brief response strategies by socially anxious individuals indicates 
that they were utilized as safety behaviors to guard against negative evaluation, consistent 
with the characterization of Clark and Wells (1995). Additionally, the researchers found 
that socially anxious subjects in the negative appraisal condition who engaged in the 
aforementioned safety behaviors were rated as less likable by partners than socially 
anxious subjects in the positive appraisal condition who did not. This latter finding could 
not be accounted for by levels of anxiety, which did not vary between conditions for the 
anxious subjects, suggesting that the behaviors themselves caused the negative 
evaluations. This interpretation provides an important measure of empirical support for 
Clark and Wells‟ (1995) claims for the counter productiveness of safety behaviors in 
preventing others‟ negative evaluations in social situations. 
 Voncken, Alden, and Bögels (2006) conducted a novel investigation of the 
consequences of engaging in safety behaviors by presenting subjects with a series of 
vignettes in which a character experiences anxiety in a social situation and asking them to 
rate how well that character would be perceived by the interaction partner in that situation 
and how they would be perceived were they to behave as the character did in that 
situation. Three different versions of the vignette were presented: one in which the 
character acknowledges his or her anxiety, one in which the character engages in safety 
behaviors to conceal his or her anxiety, and one in which the character neither 
acknowledges nor conceals his or her anxiety. Participants indicated that engaging in 
safety behaviors to conceal social anxiety would likely result in more negative outcomes 
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than either acknowledging or not responding to anxiety. This prediction was made by 
participants who scored highly on a measure of social anxiety as well as those who did 
not, indicating that the socially anxious may be as aware of the negative consequences of 
safety behaviors than those who do not suffer from social anxiety. However, in line with 
research suggesting that socially anxious individuals expect disproportionately negative 
outcomes for themselves in social situations (Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 1993; 
Wallace & Alden, 1991), the socially anxious participants in the study estimated that they 
would be perceived more negatively for engaging in the safety behaviors described in the 
vignette as compared to their estimations of how the character would be perceived, while 
non-socially anxious individuals did not. 
 Working from a communication studies perspective, Burgoon and LePoire (1993) 
examined the influence of expectancies and behavior on perceptions of conversation 
partners by asking undergraduate participates to interact with a confederate who had been 
instructed to engage in nonverbal behaviors denoting either a warm and open or a restless 
and disengaged manner. Prior to the interaction, the experimenters induced positive or 
negative expectancies in the participants by presenting them with a list of personal 
attribute ratings ostensibly completed by the confederate indicating either positive traits 
such as maturity and responsibility or negative traits such as arrogance and self-
centeredness, and augmenting this with a verbal statement that based on recent 
observations, the confederate should be either difficult or easy to work with. Results 
indicated a strong main effect for communication type, whereby the open and warm 
communicators were judged as being more positive, effective, and rewarding than the 
closed and disengaged communicators. The negative effect of the closed style of 
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nonverbal communication persisted even in instances when positive expectancies were 
induced beforehand, leading the researchers to conclude that observed communication 
behaviors can result in evaluations by others that run counter to previously held 
expectations. Although this research did not directly measure social anxiety or 
communication apprehension elements at the construct level, the “negative” nonverbal 
behaviors employed by the researchers are strikingly reminiscent of some of the safety 
behaviors described by Clark and Wells (1995), and the findings regarding the 
unfavorable effects of this style reinforce the contention that behavioral correlates of 
social anxiety increase the likelihood of undesirable evaluations by others. 
Daly, Vangelisti, and Weber (1995) conducted an empirical investigation into the 
speech preparation strategies of anxious individuals compared to their non-anxious 
counterparts. Hypothesizing that speech anxiety exerts a detrimental effect on the 
preparation elements of public speaking, the author instructed undergraduate participants 
to plan an impromptu speech by verbalizing their speaking strategy into a recorder in a 
“think-aloud” manner during the preparation period. The participants then delivered their 
speech to an audience of trained raters. The recordings of their preparations were 
analyzed by trained raters and their verbal content was divided into distinct units 
reflecting previously identified aspects of preparation such as presentation concerns, 
speech organization, phrasing, expressions of nervousness, and others. Results indicated 
that higher scores on a self-report measure of speaking anxiety predicted lower 
performance ratings on the speech itself. Furthermore, increases in speaking anxiety 
predicted less time devoted to planning critical presentation factors, such as adapting the 
speech to the audience and planning to fully utilize equipment such as visual aids and 
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more time devoted to coming up with information to include in the speech and worrying 
about capabilities as a speaker. The researchers note that all of the responses associated 
with speaking anxiety are likely to diminish one‟s capacity to be an effective presenter, 
and theorize that they are the main contributors to the observed lower performance 
ratings associated with public speaking anxiety. The conclusion that speech anxiety 
influences sufferers to focus less on preparing and executing effective presentation 
strategies and more on self-doubts and specific content concerns is highly compatible 
with Clark and Wells‟ (1995) conceptualization of safety behavior, and indicates that 
avoiding preparations to relate more directly to the audience may be a safety behavior 
that is unique to public speaking anxiety.  
 Attentional biases in external feedback. Clark and Wells (1995) state that as the 
dominant standard for comparison against the reference value, the mental image of the 
social self is subject to revision over the course of the social encounter. As per the 
dynamic nature of self-regulation, these feedback channels can take a variety of forms, 
including internal experiences and external signifiers produced by other individuals in the 
encounter. Clark and Wells (1995) theorize that for socially anxious individuals, the 
feedback process is impacted by the negative biases and tendencies toward self-focused 
attention that are commonly observed in anxious functioning. First, self-focused attention 
causes the socially anxious to be far less vigilant to external feedback in general, due to 
the finite amount of attentional resources available at any given time. Secondly, the 
tendency toward negative self-perceptions regarding social performance in such 
individuals decreases the likelihood that any external feedback that is observed will be 
interpreted as reflecting a favorable or acceptable performance. This is due largely to the 
44 
 
  
 
fact that the majority of feedback cues from others in social situations are nonverbal or 
otherwise ambiguous, particularly in public speaking scenarios, where the speaker 
typically receives no verbal feedback for the entire duration of the speaking encounter.  
As a result, Clark and Wells (1995) theorize that the individual‟s experiences of these 
feedback cues are heavily influenced by prevailing negative biases in information 
processing. These biases are thought to actively maintain the anxiety producing 
discrepancy between reference values and perceived performance by blocking the 
availability of positive external feedback, which, if recognized, would reduce both the 
discrepancy and the associated anxiety. 
 A meta-analytic study of 172 studies regarding attentional bias in anxiety by Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenberg, and van Ijzendoorn (2007) found a 
significant threat-related bias in anxious subjects that was not present in non-anxious 
subjects. Interestingly, this bias was exhibited in both conscious and non-conscious 
processing tasks, indicating that enhanced threat detection in anxious individuals is likely 
attributable to both automatic processes, such as shifts in attention, and elaborative 
processes, such as active consideration of multiple factors to determine whether a threat 
is present. In another interesting result, findings indicated that the magnitude of the 
threat-related bias was similar across all the varieties of anxiety disorder included in the 
study, which included such diverse syndromes as generalized anxiety disorder, 
posttraumatic stress disorder, and simple phobia in addition to social phobia. Also, the 
threat-related bias was found to be similar between clinically anxious individuals and 
high-anxious individuals not meeting clinical criteria for an anxiety disorder. The authors 
theorize that the latter two findings may be indicative of a broad common component to 
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all the anxiety disorders which involves threat-related attentional biases. This 
interpretation is consistent with the predictions of cognitive theory (Beck, Emery, & 
Greenberg, 1985; Beck & Clark, 1997) as well as the specific social anxiety model of 
Clark and Wells (1995). 
 Winton, Clark, and Edelmann (1995) conducted a different empirical 
investigation into attentional biases in the socially anxious by examining whether or not 
social anxiety leads to an increased ability to detect negative emotion in others. The 
authors exposed individuals reporting either high or low amounts of negative evaluation 
fears to a pair of experimental tasks involving identification of negative versus neutral 
affect on faces presented both pictorially and verbally. After an initial exposure to this 
task, subjects were told that they may be required to give a short speech in front of an 
audience as part of their participation. This was done as a means of experimentally 
manipulating social threat. Following the manipulation, the participants repeated the 
tasks. Results indicated that the social threat manipulation was not found to be effective 
in altering task responses in either group of participants. However, it was found that 
subjects who reported more negative evaluation fears were more accurate than their 
counterparts in identifying negative affect from the cues presented in the experimental 
tasks. However, they were found to be less accurate at identifying neutral affect. The 
authors interpreted this pattern of results as indicating that the increased sensitivity to 
negative affect may be the result of a general negative response bias in individuals with 
negative evaluation fears rather than an objective increase in ability to interpret social 
cues. 
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 Importance of subjective internal experience. As was alluded to in the above 
discussion of feedback interpretation, the Clark and Wells (1995) model of social anxiety 
stresses the importance of the idiographic beliefs and perceptions of the anxious 
individual in determining behavior. In many cases, the anxious individual‟s perceptions 
of his or her social self-efficacy and the likelihood and consequences of negative 
evaluation are grossly exaggerated. Likewise, the tendency of anxious individuals to infer 
negative evaluations from ambiguous feedback cues during the social situation often has 
little more than a tenuous basis in objectively verifiable fact. Despite this, the individual‟s 
subjective interpretation of the situation remains the crucial concern in determining his or 
her anxiety responses to a social situation. This idea is reflected in nearly every aspect of 
the Clark and Wells (1995) model, particularly the designation of the mental image of the 
social self as the standard of comparison to the reference value. At its core, the central 
process of comparison outlined in the model is between two subjective and internally-
generated values; the reference value and the self-perceived estimate of current 
performance. Moreover, both of these values are greatly influenced by subjective, intra-
individual biases and relatively resistant to disconfirming information from external 
sources. In the case of highly anxious individuals, such biases skew the self-regulation 
system to the point where the development of a discrepancy between current estimation 
of performance and the reference value for performance is virtually assured. The model‟s 
authors note that the highly subjective nature of this process is typically not recognized 
by anxiety sufferers, who often uncritically accept their perceptions due to the strength of 
their affective experiences during anxiety-provoking social situations.  
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One of the more intriguing sources of empirical support for the influence of 
subjective internal experiences in social and performance anxiety can be found in the 
literature outlining the “illusion of transparency” (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998). 
The phrase “illusion of transparency” describes a situation in which an individual 
believes that his or her internal emotional or cognitive experiences are apparent to 
observers when in fact these experiences are largely unavailable to others and may exert 
only a slight effect on their judgment of the individual. This bias is thought to operate 
when particularly strong internal experiences lead the affected individual to assume that 
corresponding external indicators exist and are readily perceivable.  
Although the illusion of transparency was initially demonstrated on behaviors 
within the range of normal experience, such as overestimating the ability of others to 
detect lies, nonverbal expressions of disgust, and concern over unethical behavior 
(Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998), the paradigm was applied to speaking anxiety by 
Savitsky and Gilovich (2003), who instructed pairs of participants to give impromptu 
speeches before an audience. Each participant was asked to provide ratings of how 
anxious he or she believed to have appeared during the speech and how anxious the other 
participant appeared. Results indicated that participants rated themselves as having 
appeared more nervous than their counterpart had rated them as appearing, supporting the 
operation of an illusion of transparency effect. The authors also demonstrated an 
intriguing effect whereupon participants who were informed of the effect prior to 
speaking rated themselves more positively, expected to be rated more positively by 
observers, and were actually rated more highly by said observers, indicating that the 
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effects of the illusion of transparency bias in speaking anxiety are amenable to 
intervention (Savitsky & Gilovich, 2003). 
 The success of Savitsky and Gilovich (2003) in empirically documenting the 
operation of an illusion of transparency bias in public speaking anxiety also provides 
support for the Clark and Wells (1995) social anxiety model. The finding that individuals 
in a public speaking situation frequently over-estimate how anxious they appear to 
observers reflects the above mentioned model‟s assertion that anxious responding is 
heavily influenced by internal and subjective factors. Furthermore, the illusion of 
transparency theory‟s premise that susceptibility is dependent on the intensity of the 
internal experience matches well with Clark and Wells‟ (1995) emphasis on the role of 
self-focus and interoceptive cues in producing socially anxious responding. Although the 
illusion of transparency is a general tendency and not thought to be specific to anxious 
populations, the magnitude of the over-estimation and the corresponding behavioral 
effects will in all likelihood be greater in the highly anxious due to the intense and 
aversive nature of anxiety experiences. Finally, Savitsky and Gilovich‟s (2003) 
demonstration of the positive effects of informing subjects about the illusion of 
transparency bias before a speech seems to fit coherently with Clark and Wells‟ (1995) 
account of the influence of available feedback sources in increasing or decreasing social 
and performance anxiety. 
 Further evidence for the importance of subjective interpretations of internal 
experiences in speaking anxiety comes from an experimental study conducted by Beatty 
and Behnke (1991). Working from a communication apprehension paradigm, these 
researchers examined the heart rate responses of both high-apprehensive and low-
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apprehensive individuals during two different public speaking tasks. One of these was 
constructed to be a low-intensity speaking task, in which the participants spoke in front of 
a single audience member and were informed that their data would be used only for 
experimental purposes, and the other, in which participants spoke in front of a classroom 
of 15-20 undergraduates and were informed that their speech would be evaluated by all 
present and the results forwarded to their public speaking instructors for a course grade, 
was constructed to be a high-intensity task. Results indicated that during the low-intensity 
task, the high-apprehensive speakers had significantly higher heart rates than their low-
apprehensive counterparts. However, during the high-intensity task, no statistically 
significant difference in heart rate between high and low-apprehensive speakers was 
noted, yet the high-apprehensive speakers reported significantly more anxiety than did 
the low-apprehensives on this task. 
 Beatty and Behnke (1991) interpreted this aspect of their findings as illustrative 
of the primacy of non-physiological factors, such as differences in cognitive 
interpretations of somatic experiences, in promoting speech-anxious responding. In 
discussing this point, the authors note that effective speakers who enjoy the process of 
public speaking may also experience increased physiological arousal in the form of 
enthusiasm or excitement, and suggest that further attention be paid to the more 
subjective elements that bias speaking experiences in one direction or the other. Their 
discussion again underscores the importance of identifying and empirically studying the 
characteristic patterns of experience that differentiate speech-anxious from non-anxious 
individuals, as well as tacitly acknowledging the role of these elements in measuring and 
diagnosis speaking anxiety in common settings.  
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Cognitive Assessment Methods and Social Anxiety Assessment 
 Capitalizing on advances in the theoretical and empirical literature on social 
anxiety, assessment techniques have begun moving toward more specific and externally 
valid methods of empirically measuring social anxiety. As addressed above, modern 
conceptualizations (e.g. Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Ingram 
& Kendall, 1987; Stopa & Clark, 1993) stress the influence of cognitions and other 
subjective factors on socially anxious behavior. In order to incorporate these difficult to 
quantify constructs into standardized assessments, researchers have pioneered a variety of 
techniques. Of these, research attention has focused especially on a family of methods 
known alternatively as thought-listing or cognitive self-statement assessment. As 
described by Cacioppo, von Hippel, and Ernst (1997), thought-listing is a naturalistic 
method for assessing cognitive structures in which an individual simply makes a list of 
his or her thoughts while in a specific situation. Glass and Arnkoff (1997) note that 
measures based on such methods lend the potential advantage of being able to identify 
specific patterns of cognitions associated with certain disorders or pathologies. The key 
features of thought-listing methodologies, along with relevant strengths and weaknesses, 
are discussed below.   
Cognitions as surface measures. Self-statements, or thoughts in which individuals 
evaluate some feature of their self-image or current behavior, are the crucial cognitive 
feature assessed in thought-listing (Glass & Arnkoff, 1997). Thought-listing methods 
seek to make the most accurate possible measure of cognitions as they are experienced 
within the stream of consciousness. Therefore, most thought-listing methods place great 
emphasis on individuals reporting their thoughts shortly after they are experienced. This 
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focus on veridical reporting is undergirded by the theory that such surface-level, “in the 
moment” cognitions, if measured, will exhibit distinct themes or patterns which will 
allow for distinctions between groups of interest (Clark, 1988). Cacioppo, von Hippel, 
and Ernst (1997) highlight the fact that the thought-listing technique does not require 
subjects to be aware of or provide any insight into the motivations or causal mechanisms 
that underlie their thoughts. The importance of these features is that they give the 
thought-listing technique a distinctly empirical bent, with a focus on determining whether 
or not specific and identifiable thoughts or patterns of thoughts are associated with 
specific and identifiable behaviors.  
Methods of thought-sampling. The process of quantifying self-statements, often 
referred to in the literature as “thought sampling,” can take several forms (Clark, 1988; 
Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Glass & Arnkoff, 1997; Heimberg, 1994). Of these flavors of 
cognitive self-statement assessment, the most frequently used are the endorsement and 
production methods. As described by Glass and Arnkoff (1997), endorsement methods 
involve presenting subjects with a list of potentially experienced thoughts and asking 
them to indicate whether each thought was experienced or how often the thought was 
experienced during the situation of interest. The authors note that such methods are 
popular because they allow for the creation of assessments that are easy to administer and 
score while possessing a high degree of structure. Additionally, such structured measures 
can be used to take a more deliberate and focused approach to the assessment of 
positively and negatively valenced thoughts, which can result in a more comprehensive 
picture of the cognitive features associated with the situation of interest. In a review of 
cognitive assessment measures, Clark (1988) noted that the endorsement-based measures 
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have the strongest degree of experimental support for their ability to make valid 
distinctions between groups and their sensitivity to treatment effects. These advantages 
have made the endorsement approach the most popular for self-statement assessment 
(Glass & Arnkoff, 1994). 
 Glass and Arnkoff (1997) also note several disadvantages of endorsement 
methods. The most crucial of these is the observation that the included statements may or 
may not reflect the individual‟s actual thoughts. Should endorsement items fail reflect 
cognitive products relevant to the individual‟s experience, the validity of the thought-
sampling as a whole will be subsequently compromised (Glass & Arnkoff, 1994). An 
additional weakness of endorsement measures is the possibility that the structured nature 
of these assessments may result in increased demand characteristics or reappraisals of 
thoughts after the fact, both of which represent significant threats to validity (Clark, 
1988; Glass & Arnkoff, 1997). Additionally, although the summary scores that are 
typically produced by assessments that utilize endorsement measures are useful for 
normative purposes, they may be overly reductionistic in representing the individual‟s 
cognitive features as compared to less structured methods. 
A second variety of cognitive self-statement assessment involves individuals 
making a verbal or written self-report of their thoughts. These methods, which are termed 
production methods (Glass & Arnkoff, 1994), conform fairly closely to the variant of the 
thought-listing method described by Cacioppo, von Hippel, and Ernst (1997). Production 
methods enjoy some advantages in comparison to endorsement methods. Foremost 
among these is the avoidance of potential demand characteristics involved with 
endorsement methods due to the fact that production methods do not prompt participants 
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with specific thoughts that may have occurred in the situation (Heimberg, 1994). 
Cacioppo, von Hippel, and Ernst (1997) also cite the utility of production methods in 
situations where hypotheses about the relevant cognitive dimensions to be investigated 
are relatively unformed, necessitating a more exploratory tack for the research. Arnkoff 
and Glass (1989) report that the thought-listing method in particular has shown a great 
degree of versatility as a measure of cognitions in social anxiety research, generally 
displaying excellent inter-rater reliability and good construct validity, while offering a 
richer vein of information than is usually produced by endorsement measures.  
However, the production method also has some notable limitations. The first of 
these is the possibility that individuals may deliberately misreport their thoughts for 
social desirability reasons or that biases in processing or memory may influence the 
process of reporting thoughts, both of which may be difficult to consistently control for in 
research (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997). Additionally, in his review of cognitive 
assessments, Clark (1988) reported that the ability of production measures to distinguish 
between high and low-anxious subjects has varied from study to study, suggesting that 
the validity of such measures may vary depending on factors such as the specific variety 
of anxiety being assessed and the method of judging employed to rate the collected self-
statements. Finally, Glass and Furlong (1990) found that the Social Interaction Self-
Statement Test (SISST; Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982), an endorsement 
measure of social anxiety, displayed stronger correlations with measures of social 
anxiety-related beliefs, concerns, and behaviors than did a thought-listing measure when 
both were administered after an interaction task. The authors interpreted this finding as an 
indication that the unstructured nature of production methods may suffer from power and 
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specificity issues in comparison to psychometrically sound endorsement measures (Glass 
& Furlong, 1990).  
Situational exposure. One of the key features of cognitive assessment is the 
emphasis placed on identifying thoughts within the context of the specific situations in 
which they occur. This focus on specificity can be traced back to the influence of 
cognitive theory (Beck, 1976; Ingram & Kendall, 1987), which explicitly outlines 
connections between specific cognitions, contexts, and behaviors. In order to ensure the 
most valid association between measured cognitions and the behaviors and situations of 
interest, the majority of social anxiety studies utilizing such measures expose participants 
to an experimentally-controlled analog of the situation of interest, such as an unstructured 
conversation (Alden, Bieling, & Wallace, 1994; Glass & Furlong, 1990; Wallace & 
Alden, 1991) or public speech (Rodebaugh & Rapee, 2005; Savitsky & Gilovich, 2003; 
Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000). A prototypical example of this practice is 
described by Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, and Larsen (1982) in their account of the 
development of the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test (SISST), a self-statement 
measure of anxiety during heterosocial (opposite-sex) interaction situations. The items on 
the SISST were generated by asking undergraduate subjects to imagine themselves in 
specific heterosocial interaction situations and record thoughts they would likely 
experience in that situation. After the item generation process, the researchers tested the 
validity of the resultant measure by giving it to high and low socially anxious subjects 
following a 3-minute interaction task with an opposite-sex confederate, finding that the 
SISST was successfully able to discriminate between the two groups.  
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The use of situational exposure in cognitive self-statement assessment aids 
researchers in acquiring valid measures of the cognitions of interest (Glass & Arnkoff, 
1994). Cacioppo, von Hippel and Ernst (1997) outline several methodological aspects 
which can serve to broaden the likelihood of maximizing such validity. The most 
important of these is limiting the amount of time that elapses between the exposure 
situation and the assessment of thoughts. This reduces the likelihood that memory biases 
or forgetfulness will cause the recorded thoughts to markedly differ from those that are 
experienced in the stream of consciousness. A second important concern is attempting to 
ensure that the experimental situation corresponds to an external situation that is likely to 
produce anxiety for the subjects. By manipulating certain features of the situation, such 
as having participants interact with an attractive member of the opposite sex or stressing 
that a speech will be evaluated by judges, the power of the situations to promote anxiety 
can be increased, with subsequent benefits for validity (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 
1997). 
Judging issues. Whether self-statements are collected by production or 
endorsement methods, it is the task of researchers to designate how these statements are 
to be evaluated. In many cases, this is done by trained judges, who provide independent 
ratings according to criteria provided by the researchers. However, within the empirical 
literature, there has been a great amount of variance observed both in the criteria on 
which thoughts are rated and the methods used to rate them. To address the latter issue, 
Tarico, Van Velzen, and Altmaier (1986) compared three commonly used rating methods 
to evaluate thoughts generated by a public speaking situation: subject self-rating, rating 
by experts with thoughts presented in the order in which they were originally generated, 
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and rating by experts with thoughts presented in random order. The researchers found 
high inter-rater reliability between the three groups and strong predictive validity for all 
three methods for public speaking anxiety as measured by the Personal Report of 
Confidence as a Speaker (Paul, 1966).  Interpreting these results as suggestive of a 
general equivalency between methods in terms of validity and reliability, the authors 
recommended that rating method for evaluation of thoughts be selected by weighing the 
expenditure of time and resources needed to employ trained raters against the potential 
that such trained raters might display better judgment in instances where the evaluation 
criteria require a greater degree of inference.  
Valence scoring. The most commonly applied rating criteria in self-statement 
assessments, particularly in social anxiety research, is the emotional valence of thoughts. 
Cacioppo, von Hippel, and Ernst (1997) discuss the practice of evaluating listed thoughts 
for positive or negative emotionality, noting that various methods have been employed to 
do so, including simple frequency counts and more elaborate indices incorporating ratios. 
This topic was given a more thorough empirical treatment by Amsel and Fichten (1990), 
who compared raw-frequency scoring methods on a self-statement assessment to two 
different ratio scores, one representing the proportion of positive to negative thoughts and 
the other representing the proportion of positive thoughts to the combined total of 
positive and negative thoughts. Results indicated that the latter ratio score, known as the 
States-of-Mind ratio (SOM; Schwartz & Garamoni, 1986), with a slight correction 
applied in cases in which the subject reports either no positive or negative thoughts, was 
generally the most suitable statistic, due to this ratio‟s ability to both accurately represent 
the data and provide a common metric for comparison across studies. Furthermore, 
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positive thoughts were more frequently reported than negative thoughts, and that positive 
and negative thoughts were found to be functionally independent, rather than representing 
opposite ends of a continuum (Amsel & Ficten, 1990).  
This characterization of positive and negative affect as distinct systems mirrors 
the predictions and observations of self-regulation theorists (Carver & Scheier, 1981; 
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Carver, 2006).  Many social anxiety researchers (e.g. Cacioppo, 
von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Heimberg, 1994) have also 
conceptualized affect in this manner.  Glass and Arnkoff (1994) favorably evaluated the 
validity of the SOM ratio in assessing self-statements in social phobia, particularly in the 
areas of representativeness and convergent validity with self-report measures. When 
these results are taken in concert with the wealth of evidence in the empirical literature 
connecting negative affect with socially anxious functioning (Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa 
& Clark, 1993; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000), the utility of emotional valence as a focus of 
self-statement evaluation in social anxiety assessment is quite well supported. 
Attentional focus scoring. Despite the wide acceptance of emotional valence as a 
key metric in evaluating social anxiety-relevant self-statements, investigators (e.g. 
Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; Clark, 1988; Glass & Arnkoff, 1997) have 
increasingly begun to question whether simply evaluating the positivity or negativity of a 
self-statement provides an adequate representation of that statement‟s relationship to 
socially anxious behavior. As discussed above, theoretical and empirical work has led to 
a conceptualization of socially anxious behavior that is considerably more nuanced than 
mere distinction between positive and negative affect. To this end, theorists have 
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increasingly emphasized the benefits of also evaluating attentional focus in cognitive 
self-statement assessment. 
The role of attention, especially self-focused attention, in socially anxious 
behavior has been well-documented (Melchior & Cheek, 1990; Pilkonis, 1977; Pineles & 
Mineka, 2005; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000), suggesting that broadening 
self-statement evaluation criteria to include such information might increase predictive 
validity. In their investigation of self-statement scoring methods, Amsel and Fichten 
(1990) evaluated for attentional focus as well as emotional valence, finding that 
interactions of the two dimensions were endorsed at different frequencies, with self-
related positive thoughts being more common than self-related negative thoughts, and 
other-related negative thoughts being more common than other-related positive thoughts. 
As a result, the SOM ratio scores when self-statements were grouped by attentional focus 
were significantly different from when emotional valence was the only criteria employed, 
revealing that subjects reported significantly more self-related than other-related 
thoughts. Although the situation employed by Amsel and Fichten (1990) was not 
specifically designed to measure social anxiety, there is strong support for the idea that 
adding a focus of attention dimension to self-statement evaluation can capture additional 
between-group variance useful in assessing social anxiety (Glass & Arnkoff, 1994). 
Validity Issues in Cognitive Assessment  
 While cognitive assessment and thought-listing methods offer a robust strategy 
for creating empirically-based assessments of group differences, the fundamental 
intangibility of cognitions necessitates that great care be taken to ensure that validity be 
preserved. To an even greater degree than with other methods, self-statement measures 
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are subject to threats to psychometric soundness throughout the formulation process 
(Glass & Arnkoff, 1994). As such, researchers have taken pains to survey the existing 
literature on self-statement measures in order to identify relevant concerns and pitfalls to 
be avoided. 
 Situational specificity. As previously discussed, Glass and Arnkoff (1994) note 
that using an anxiety provoking situation to generate self-statements for use as potential 
item measures can be problematic if the situation does not closely match the context in 
which the assessment is designed to be employed. This is particularly important in social 
anxiety assessment, as social situations take a variety of forms, with different features 
potentially influencing the nature and amount of anxiety experienced. For instance, the 
self-statements associated with anxiety in a public speaking situation may be qualitatively 
different from those associated with anxiety in an interaction situation.  
In a precursor to the current study, Beck, Marin, Huber, and Rodriguez (2005) 
used a thought listing measure to collect self-statements about public speaking from a 
sample of 35 undergraduate participants. In order to ensure that the collected cognitions 
were as representative as possible to a real-world public speaking scenario, care was 
taken to reconstruct the prototypical features of public speaking, such as the presence of 
an audience, expectations of coherence and clarity in the verbal content of the speech, 
and non-verbal behavioral elements such as having the subject stand and deliver his or 
her speech while the audience sat passively. Participants in this study were explicitly 
instructed to treat the speaking scenario as they would a speech in a real-world setting 
such as a classroom. High correlations were found between participant self-reports of 
anxiety on the experimental task and scores on the Personal Report of Confidence as a 
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Speaker Scale (PRCS; Paul, 1966), suggesting that the task successfully elicited anxiety 
from individuals who generally tend to be speech-anxious. 
In their review of current issues in self-statement measures of social and 
performance anxiety, Glass and Arnkoff (1994) express concerns about several 
researchers employing the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test (SISST) to evaluate 
public speaking anxiety-related cognitions, despite the fact that the measure was 
developed to assess anxiety during interactions with the opposite-sex. The authors 
caution that the SISST may lack content validity for public speaking anxiety, thereby 
threatening the strength of results when this measure is used for such purposes. A variety 
of authors commenting on the use of cognitive measures in social anxiety echo similar 
concerns (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; Clark, 1988; Heimberg, 1994), 
recommending that such measures be used only in the specific situation for which they 
were developed in order to maximize validity. In situations where a well-validated 
cognitive measure is not available, researchers are encouraged to create and validate one 
using empirically sound psychometric methods in lieu of substituting a less appropriate 
test (Clark, 1988).  
 Criterion-related validity. A second critical concern in creating a cognitive 
assessment measure of anxiety is ensuring that the items be of sufficient specificity and 
sensitivity to distinguish between high and low-anxious individuals. Most of the 
empirical support for self-statement measures in this area comes from the use of 
contrasted groups, in which the responses of individuals previously known to suffer from 
social and performance anxiety are contrasted with those of individuals who do not. Glass 
and Arnkoff (1994) conclude that the literature on contrasted groups using the SISST and 
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other measures generally supports the ability of self-statement measures to distinguish 
between socially anxious and non-anxious individuals, particularly with frequency of 
negative thoughts. The authors note that some problems exist with method variance in 
terms of self-statement generation and rating, which may be responsible for the 
conflicting study results regarding the factors that distinguish anxious from non-anxious 
individuals. Additionally, they observed that current measures have been inconsistent in 
their ability to distinguish between subtypes of social phobia and that such measures may, 
in some cases, be confounded with the presence of depressive symptoms. This latter 
remark lends another indication that self-statement measures of social anxiety processes 
may greatly benefit from increased specificity through broadening validation samples to 
include individuals with a variety of pathologies beyond social anxiety and validating 
measures in connection with a variety of situations, both related and un-related to the 
construct of interest (Glass & Arnkoff, 1994).  
Measure reactivity. Glass and Arnkoff (1994) also consider the possibility that the 
process of measuring self-statements might damage validity by confounding the subject‟s 
experiences of anxiety or self-evaluation. Although reviewed studies indicate that the 
thought-listing process by itself does not affect subject self-reports of anxiety or 
estimated performance, reactivity may become a problem when subject responses to the 
experimental social situation are conspicuously observed, such as when a judge or video 
camera is present. These elements may increase the individual‟s sense that he or she is 
being evaluated, resulting in elevated feelings of self-consciousness. Based on the results 
of a study that found the presence of a video camera significantly altered subject 
proportions of positive and negative thoughts on a thought-listing measure and the reports 
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of other investigators that more surreptitious tactics such as hidden cameras or audio-
recording eliminate this effect, Glass and Arnkoff (1994) recommended that researchers 
be cognizant of the potential for reactivity when planning their investigations.    
Sensitivity to change. A final concern in assessing the validity of a cognitive 
measure of social anxiety is the ability of that measure to detect change. Given that 
cognitive processes occupy a central role in theoretical conceptualizations of social 
anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Stopa & Clark, 1993) and that 
such processes are targeted for change in psychotherapy for these issues (Beck, Emery, & 
Greenberg, 1985), valid change detection is clearly one of the most important functions 
of cognitive measures of social anxiety. Heimberg (1994), in a review of empirical 
studies on the change sensitivity of currently employed measures of social anxiety, noted 
a relative paucity of data on cognitive self-statement measures. The majority of cited 
research on endorsement measures of cognitions focused on the ability of the SISST to 
assess change for pre to post-treatment in social phobics, which has largely been 
supported. However, Heimberg cautions that all of the reviewed studies either made some 
change to the measure or employed it in a situation other than the heterosocial 
interactions that it was designed for, which may compromise validity.  
Heimberg (1994) also reviewed studies that measured change using general 
thought-listing production measures. Although there were again a small number of 
investigations and substantial method variance in terms of cognition rating, a trend was 
observed in which negative cognitions in social phobics were significantly reduced post-
treatment, and some studies indicated that this effect was greater when cognitive-
behavioral treatments were used. Despite these promising initial results, the author 
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emphasized the limited scope of current studies of the ability of self-statement measures 
to be sensitive to change and called for greater utilization of production and endorsement 
cognitive measures in future research before stronger conclusions are able to be drawn. In 
doing so, he entreats investigators to pay more attention to the role of information 
processing in devising cognitive assessments, noting that despite a plethora of evidence 
suggesting that socially anxious individuals display significant preferences for threat-
related cues, these and other processing characteristics have not been incorporated into 
assessments in any meaningful way. Since thought process may be as, or more, important 
as thought content in terms of being a target for change in social anxiety, such advances 
in assessment could yield significant improvements in the efficacy of measures to assess 
change.  
The Current Study 
 The current study addresses a critical gap in social anxiety assessment by using 
empirical methods to validate a self-statement measure of public speaking anxiety. 
Currently, the most commonly used measures of public speaking anxiety suffer from a 
variety of limitations. The majority (i.e. Paul, 1966; Watson & Friend, 1969) have not 
been developed using empirical methodologies, and thus may contain items with 
problematic content or poor criterion-related validity. Furthermore, the public speaking 
anxiety measures that have been developed using empirical methods of self-statement 
generation have significant problems. One (Hofmann & DiBartolo, 2000) uses self-
statement items that were not generated by a public speaking situation, calling the 
specificity of the measure into question. Another (Cho, Smits, & Telch, 2004) assesses 
only negative self-statements, which may be limiting when considering findings in the 
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literature (Alden & Wallace, 1991; Carver, 2006; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Woody, 1996; 
Woody & Rodriguez, 2000) that point to the potential benefits for considering 
discriminant validity of assessing positive affect and adding a focus of attention 
dimension. 
 In light of this situation, the research line that produced this study has undertaken 
to develop a measure of public speaking anxiety with items that are derived from self-
statements generated by anxious and non-anxious individuals in an experimental public 
speaking situation. Furthermore, these items have been rated for focus of attention as well 
as emotional valence, with the expectation that incorporating this dimension will add 
more power in differentiating high-anxious individuals. Additionally, the measure has 
been designed for greater sensitivity to speaking anxiety as a dimensional construct by 
using a five-point scale rather than a dichotomous response format.  
Precursors to the Current Study 
 In attempting to generate a more empirically-derived measure of public speaking 
anxiety, the current study builds upon previous research conducted specifically to provide 
the proposed measure with a pool of empirically-generated items. This study and the 
preceding investigations collectively form a multi-part effort to ensure that scale items 
reflect the key validity criteria outlined above by Glass and Arnkoff (1994). The 
methodology of each is briefly summarized below. 
Collection of speaking-related cognitions. Beck, Huber, Marin, & Rodriguez 
(2005) recruited 35 undergraduate participants at Southern Illinois University at 
Carbondale to participate in the initial collection of speaking-related cognitions for this 
project. All participants completed the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker 
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(PRCS; Paul, 1966). Nineteen of these participants (54% of the sample) received a score 
above 15 on the measure and were designated as high in public speaking anxiety based 
on a median split, with the remaining 16 participants (46% of the sample) with scores of 
14 or lower being designated as low in public speaking anxiety. Each participant was 
asked to give a speech of roughly three minutes in length, on one of three topics 
(“Describe life in Carbondale”, “describe what you did last summer”, or “describe your 
favorite holiday”). All speeches were recorded on videotape, and participants were 
informed that an audience of two individuals would be observing their speech through a 
one-way mirror and rating their performance. This last manipulation was performed to 
ensure that the participant would perceive himself or herself as a focus of evaluation 
during the speaking situation; no audience was actually present on the other side of the 
mirror. Participants were given a five-minute period to prepare their thoughts before the 
speech. At the end of this period, each participant was given a thought-listing form and 
asked to write down all of the thoughts they could recall having in the previous five 
minutes. Additionally, each participant provided estimations on a 0-100 Subjective Units 
of Distress (SUDS; Wolpe, 1969) scale of how anxious he or she expected to feel during 
the task and how well he or she expected to perform on the speech. Upon completion of 
the speech, participants were asked list their thoughts during the speech itself on a second 
form and to rate their anxiety experiences and speech performance on the same scale on 
which they had previously made their estimations. Finally, participants completed the 
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), and a short demographic 
measure. 
66 
 
  
 
Conversion of self-statements into potential measure items. After collecting a pool 
of cognitive self-statements in the aforementioned manner, two trained raters evaluated 
each thought for both affective valence (positive, negative, or neutral) and focus of 
attention (self-focused, other-focused, or undifferentiated) using standardized guidelines 
created especially for the study. Following the rating process, the self-statements were 
assessed for their potential to serve as measure items. In order to ensure that the selected 
self-statements were those that were best able to positively differentiate speech-anxious 
from non-anxious subjects, a variety of factors were considered in this process. First, 
given the empirical findings that negative, self-focused cognitions are most often 
associated with anxiety, self-statements rated as meeting this criterion were considered to 
be more discriminating. Secondly, self-statements generated by individuals who scored 
highly on the PRCS and reported more anxiety about the speaking task were considered 
more discriminating than those generated by individuals with lower PRCS scores and less 
self-reported anxiety. Finally, self-statements which were similar to those made by other 
participants were judged to be more reliable correlates of speaking anxiety than self-
statements which were less commonly reported. The selected self-statements were then 
re-phrased into grammatically correct complete sentences which preserved the original 
wording to the greatest degree possible. This process yielded a pool of 35 potential 
measure items containing multiple exemplars of all four of the possible combinations of 
affective valence (positive or negative) and attentional focus (self-focused or other-
focused) theorized to be relevant to speaking anxiety. 
  Self-statement item endorsement study. To ensure that the potential measure items 
remained valid and generalizable correlates of speaking anxiety following their 
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conversion from the original listed thoughts, another study was performed utilizing a 
sample of 91 undergraduate students. In a similar fashion to the previous study, these 
participants were asked to make a three minute extemporaneous speech on one of several 
standardized topics. The experimental situation was modified to include two audience 
members, in addition to the video camera, in the room in which the speech was given. 
This change was made in response to indications from the previous study that being 
unable to see the purported evaluators lessened the pressure of speaking somewhat. 
Participants were again told that the audience would be rating their speech; however, 
while the audience members were instructed to hold clipboards and appear to be making 
notes during the speech, no actual ratings were made. As before, participants were asked 
to provide estimations and then ratings of their anxiety and performance on a 0-100 
SUDS scale. For this study, an endorsement measure of self-statements was substituted 
for the thought-listing production measure used in the previous investigation. Following 
the speech, participants were presented with a list of the 35 potential measure items and 
asked to indicate which of the thoughts they experienced while speaking. The participants 
also completed the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (Paul, 1966) and a short 
demographic measure.  
In order to assess whether the self-statement items maintained associations with 
public speaking anxiety in their revised forms, bivariate correlations were calculated 
between each of the 35 items and the three specific measures of public speaking anxiety 
taken (the Personal Report of Confidence and the pre- and post-speech self-report 
ratings). Results indicated that of the 35 potential measure items, 24 were correlated with 
all three measures at a statistically significant level (α < .05), and of the remaining items, 
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six were correlated with two of the three measures at the .05 level, and three were 
correlated with one. Only two of the items failed to reach statistical significance with any 
of the public speaking anxiety measures. It should be noted that the pre-speech estimation 
of anxiety was the measure which most commonly failed to correlate with the proposed 
items, which occurred in nine cases. In the four instances where significant correlations 
were obtained between the other two members, this may reflect variance in the ability of 
participants to accurately predict their own anxiety before speaking rather than a lack of 
relationship between the potential items and the construct of interest. The overall pattern 
of results obtained from this study suggests a strong basis for the validity of the potential 
items employed in the current study. 
Affective valence and attentional focus rating. Finally, in order to ensure that the 
35 prospective measure items reflected an appropriate range of combinations of positive 
or negative affective valence and self or other-focus of attention, each item was rated on 
both dimensions by two independent raters. Both raters were trained to make these 
evaluations using standardized criteria guidelines authored by the primary researcher of 
the current study. These criteria included a third response option for both affective 
valence (reflecting neutral affect) and attentional focus (reflecting undifferentiated focus), 
providing a total of nine categories to allow the raters greater flexibility in response 
options. Reliability analysis indicated that the raters reached perfect agreement on all 35 
of the items, Kappa = 1.0 (p < .0001). Of the 35 potential items, 7 were judged to be self-
focused and positive, 16 were judged to be self-focused and negative, 3 were judged to be 
other-focused and positive, and the remaining 8 were judged to be other-focused and 
negative. None of the items were judged to contain undifferentiated focus of attention or 
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neutral affective valence. The over-representation of negatively valenced items, and self-
focused negative items in particular, is reflective of empirical studies (e.g. Beazley, 
Glass, Chambless, & Arnkoff, 2001; Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993; Pineles & 
Mineka, 2005; Woody, 1996) documenting the importance of these factors in predicting 
social anxiety.  
Goals and Hypotheses of the Current Study 
 The primary aim of the current study is to produce a self-report measure of public 
speaking anxiety through factor analysis of items adapted from empirically-generated 
cognitive self-statements. The first aim of the study is to use exploratory factor-analytic 
methods and item-total correlations to determine empirically which of the 35 prospective 
items are appropriate for inclusion in the final measure. In addition to generating the 
measure, the current study also seeks to gather preliminary psychometric data regarding 
internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity with other measures of 
speaking and social anxiety. The overarching goal of the investigation is to provide initial 
data to establish the measure as a reliable and valid assessment of public speaking anxiety 
that offers tangible predictive benefits in comparison to existing measures. Specific 
reliability and validity hypotheses for the study include: 
1. Cronbach‟s alpha estimates of internal reliability for the final measure in an 
undergraduate sample will fall into the good to excellent range of .80 to .95 as described 
by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). 
2. The final measure will demonstrate convergent validity with the Personal 
Report of Confidence as a Speaker (Paul, 1966), an existing measure of public speaking 
anxiety. Due to the equivalence of the constructs being assessed by both measures, the 
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effect size is expected to be in the high range of r =.5 or above as described by Cohen 
(1988). 
3. The final version of the SCAS will demonstrate discriminant validity with the 
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969) and the Social Avoidance 
and Distress Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), which are measures of negative evaluation 
fears and anxiety-related social avoidance behaviors respectively. Since these are general 
social anxiety measures and not specific to public speaking situations, the size of this 
effect is expected to be lower than that displayed between the final measure and the 
Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker, falling in the moderate range of roughly .3 
as described by Cohen (1988). 
4. The final version of the SCAS will demonstrate convergent validity with the 
public self-consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, 
& Buss, 1975), which measures self-focusing tendencies in social situations. Since self-
focusing tendencies are theorized to be of particular importance in public speaking 
anxiety, the size of the effect is expected to be in the moderate range of roughly r = .3 as 
described by Cohen (1988). 
5. The final SCAS will demonstrate discriminant validity with the private self-
consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 
1975), which measures self-focusing for introspection and personal awareness. Since this 
construct is not theorized to contribute to public speaking anxiety, the size of the effect is 
expected to be in the non-existent or trivial range of r < .1 as described by Cohen (1988). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Method 
 
The current study is part of a larger line of research aimed at producing a 
cognitive self-statement measure of public speaking anxiety, and specifically contributes 
initial data on factor structure, reliability, and validity using a sample of undergraduates 
attending a mid-sized public university located in the Midwest. A primary goal of this 
study is the creation of a measure of public speaking anxiety that is more empirically-
based and more specific to the public speaking situation than existing measures.  To this 
end, the study builds upon previous work in which public speaking-specific cognitions 
were collected from anxious and non-anxious individuals using the thought-listing 
method (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997) and then re-validated using an 
endorsement-based strategy (Glass & Arnkoff, 1997). These cognitive self-statements 
were previously evaluated for emotional valence and focus of attention by independent 
raters, and were subsequently utilized as potential measure items employed in the current 
study. The resultant data was used to create a final measure from the pool of prospective 
items, which was then analyzed for convergent validity with existing measures of public 
speaking anxiety, social anxiety, and self-focused attention. 
Participants 
 Participants were 367 undergraduate students enrolled in Psychology courses at 
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. Of these, 201 participants (54.8% of sample) 
were female, and 166 participants (45.2% of the sample) were male. The mean age of 
participants was 20.6 years (SD= 3.5). The predominant ethnic groups in the sample were 
White, non-Hispanic, reported by 239 participants (65.1%) and Black or African-
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American, reported by 96 participants (26.2%). Complete demographic data is presented 
in Table 1. All participants were compensated with course credit for their participation. 
No restrictions were placed on subject recruitment.  
Procedure 
 Participants presented for data collection sessions in groups. An undergraduate or 
graduate research assistant serving as the experimenter for the session briefed the 
participants in full on their rights as subjects and obtained informed consent for study 
participation. Participants were told that the intent of the study was to collect data about 
the ways undergraduates think and behave, and that they would be answering questions 
about their experiences in public speaking and social situations. Following the informed 
consent procedure, participants were given a packet of self-report questionnaire surveys 
containing the prospective public speaking anxiety measure items, the Personal Report of 
Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS; Paul, 1966), the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
(FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969), the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS; Watson 
& Friend, 1969), the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), 
and a demographic questionnaire. For some participants (n = 196), the measures were 
included in a mass survey of undergraduates alongside other psychological measures not 
germane to the present research. After completion of the entire packet of measures, 
participants were presented with a debriefing form explaining the goals of the study in 
greater detail, thanked for their participation, and dismissed. 
Measures 
Prospective Items for Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale. Thirty-five 
potential items designed to assess public speaking anxiety related cognitions (Beck & 
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Rodriguez, 2006) for the measure of interest were administered to participants in a self-
report questionnaire. All items took the form of declarative self-statements about public 
speaking that were adapted from a previous study (Beck, Huber, Marin, & Rodriguez, 
2005) which collected cognitions from participants who had participated in a public 
speaking task. The current study instructed participants to visualize their last few public 
speaking experiences as a point of reference before responding to the items. Item 
responses were made on a five-point rating scale ranging from 0 – 4, with a response of 0 
indicating that the participant “never” experiences this cognition, a response of 2 
indicating that the participant experiences this cognition “about half the time,” and a 
response of 4 indicating that the participant “always” experiences this cognition while 
speaking in public.  
Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker. The Personal Report of Confidence 
as a Speaker (PRCS; Paul, 1966) is a 30-item self-report questionnaire designed to assess 
public speaking fears. Responses are made in a true/false format.  The PRCS was 
developed as the short form of a longer measure (Gilkinson, 1942), and has remained in 
continued use due to its effectiveness as a screening measure for public speaking anxiety 
(Phillips, Jones, Rieger, & Snell, 1997). Paul (1966) found that PRCS scores exhibited 
similar patterns of change to self-reported anxiety scores following a public speaking 
anxiety intervention, a good indicator of convergent validity. Daly (1978) obtained an 
alpha reliability of .91 for the PRCS in one administration and an alpha reliability of .94 
in a replication, both of which indicate excellent internal reliability. Finally, Phillips, 
Jones, Rieger, and Snell (1997) found no main effects of gender or age on PRCS score, 
indicating discriminant validity for the instrument. The Cronbach‟s alpha internal 
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reliability statistic for the PRCS in the current sample was calculated at .90, indicating 
excellent internal reliability.  
Social Avoidance and Distress Scale. The Social Avoidance and Distress Scale 
(SADS), developed by Watson and Friend (1969), is a 28-item true/false format scale 
designed to assess tendencies toward anxious and avoidant reactions in social situations. 
The scale consists of two subscales, which assess avoidance and distress, respectively. 
Watson and Friend (1969) reported a Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 reliability statistic of 
.94 for the SADS as well as a product-moment correlation of .75 between the two 
subscales. Leary (1991) observes that the SADS displays correlations of r ≥ .75 with 
many other measures of social anxiety, that high scorers on the scale report greater 
anxiety in real interactions than do low scorers, and that the scale has been successfully 
used as a measure of outcome in a multitude of clinical investigations into social anxiety 
treatment. Thus, the SADS demonstrates very good convergent validity. The Cronbach‟s 
alpha internal reliability statistic for the SADS in the current sample was calculated at 
.92, indicating excellent internal reliability. 
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. The Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE) 
is a 30-item true/false format scale developed by Watson and Friend (1969) to assess 
negative evaluation fears. The FNE has excellent internal consistency, rKR20 = .94. The 
FNE was developed concurrently with the SADS scale, and the constructs each scale 
assesses are conceptualized as complementary factors in producing social anxiety. As 
such, the FNE correlates moderately with the SADS scale (r = .51), and evidence shows 
that high FNE scorers report more anxiety in evaluative settings and more concern about 
being negatively evaluated than do low scorers (Leary, 1991). The FNE is widely used in 
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empirical research into specific components of social anxiety (e.g. Rapee & Lim, 1992; 
Stopa & Clark, 1993) which have found it able to reliably differentiate socially phobic 
individuals from control subjects, providing a strong indication of its validity. The 
Cronbach‟s alpha internal reliability statistic for the FNE in the current sample was 
calculated at .92, indicating excellent internal reliability. 
Self-Consciousness Scale. The Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975) is a 23-item self-report measure of self-consciousness. Responses 
to the scale items are made on a 5-point Likert scale anchored by “not at all like me” and 
“very much like me.” In addition to a total score, the SCS yields three subscale scores, 
which respectively measure public self-consciousness, private self-consciousness, and 
social anxiety. Test-retest data following a two-week interval (Fenigstein, Scheier, & 
Buss, 1975) indicate that the SCS displays adequate reliability, with correlations of .80 
for the total score, .84 for the public self-consciousness subscale, .79 for the private self-
consciousness subscale, and .73 for the social anxiety subscale. The SCS is the most 
commonly employed self-report measure of self-focused attention (Mor & Wilquist, 
2007), and has been widely employed in social anxiety research. The public self-
consciousness subscale has demonstrated particularly robust associations with social 
anxiety (Pilkonis, 1977; Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes, 1978) and related constructs 
such as fear of negative evaluation (Monfries & Kafer, 1994), suggesting that both the 
SCS and the construct of self-consciousness in general have a valid relationship with 
social anxiety. Additionally, Carver and Glass (1976) demonstrated discriminant validity 
for the public and private self-consciousness subscales of the SCS by finding that neither 
subscale correlates with measures of intelligence, need for achievement, test anxiety, 
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impulsivity, or activity level. The Cronbach‟s alpha internal reliability statistic for the 
SCS in the current sample was calculated at .83, indicating good internal reliability. 
Demographics questionnaire. Participants were also administered a short self-
report questionnaire designed especially for use in this study. This measure assessed the 
demographic variables of gender, age, ethnicity, and year in school. Participants also 
provided an estimate of the length of time that has elapsed since their last public speech 
or presentation by selecting from a series of time ranges.  
Analytic Strategy 
 Data analyses for the current study were designed to accomplish two major goals. 
The first goal was the empirical evaluation of the 35 prospective measure items for 
inclusion in a final version of the Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale, and provision 
of descriptive statistics regarding internal reliability and factor structure of this final 
measure. To accomplish this, an exploratory factor analysis and item-total correlations 
were performed on the 35 prospective measure items. Following guidelines suggested by 
Kline (1986), items which do not load clearly on a single factor, do not load on any factor 
at a minimum of .4, or do not correlate with the total at a minimum of .5 were dropped. 
Following the item elimination process, Cronbach‟s alpha internal reliability was 
calculated for the final measure. 
 The second major goal of the current research was examining the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the final measure. Since the SCAS was designed to specifically 
measure public speaking anxiety, the pattern of Pearson‟s r correlations between it and 
other measures with varying degrees of overlap with the construct of public speaking 
anxiety were examined. As such, these correlations were interpreted as measures of effect 
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size, using criteria specified by Cohen (1988), rather than for significance testing 
purposes. The pattern of correlations with the highest degree of theoretical overlap with 
construct of public speaking anxiety is as follows: highest effect size observed between 
the SCAS and the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (Paul, 1966), moderate 
effect sizes between the SCAS and the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & 
Friend, 1969), the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), and the 
Public Self-Consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, 
& Buss, 1975), and a miniscule effect size observed between the SCAS and the Private 
Self-Consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale. Convergent- and 
discriminant validity hypothesis testing were interpreted based on degree of resemblance 
to these effect size patterns. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Results 
Data Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics. 367 participants completed the study. 55 percent of the 
sample (n = 201) was female. The mean age of study participants was 20.6 years (SD = 
3.5). The most frequently endorsed ethnicities were White, non-Hispanic (n = 239, 
65.1%) and Black/African American (n = 96, 26.2%), which combined to account for 91 
percent of the sample. Eighty percent of the sample (n = 297) reported that they had 
given a public speech or presentation in the last six months. Complete demographics for 
gender, ethnicity, and reported last public speech or presentation are presented in Table 1. 
Prospective item evaluation. Items for inclusion in the final measure were 
selected from the 35 prospective measure items based on the results of exploratory factor 
analysis and item-total correlations. Criteria for item exclusion were defined before 
conducting the analysis. As suggested by Kline (1986), it was decided that items which 
did not load clearly onto a single factor, load onto any factor at a minimum of .4, or 
exhibit an item-total correlation of .5 or higher would be dropped. With regard to 
statistical assumptions, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was 
calculated to be .97, indicating that partial correlations among variables meet criteria for 
factor analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), and Bartlett‟s Test of Sphericity was 
significant at .000, indicating the factorability of the obtained correlation matrix 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  
An initial exploratory factor analysis was conducted using the Maximum 
Likelihood extraction method to determine the appropriate number of factors to retain.  
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Table 1 
Gender, Ethnicity, and Time since Last Speech Demographics (N = 367) 
 
            Number  Percent of total 
 
Gender 
 Female      201   54.8   
 Male      166   45.2 
Ethnicity 
 American Indian/Alaska Native       2       .5 
 Asian          6     1.6 
 Black/African-American      96   26.2 
 Hispanic/Latino/a       12     3.3 
 Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander       1     1.7 
 White, non-Hispanic    239   65.1 
 Other        11     3.0 
Time since last public speech or presentation 
 Two weeks or less    101   27.5 
 About 1 month       51   13.9 
 About 3 months       91   24.8 
 About 6 months       54   14.7 
 About 1 year       40   10.9 
 More than 1 year ago      27     7.4 
 Never given public speech/presentation      3       .8 
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Several methods of examining the data were employed in making this determination. 
Using the criterion of retaining factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001) indicated that four factors should be retained, as the initial eigenvalues were 
16.7, 2.3, 1.3, and 1.1. However, a visual examination of the scree plot (Figure 1) 
appeared to indicate that a two or three-factor solution would be a more appropriate fit to 
the data. Conduction of parallel analysis, a method which involves the comparison of raw 
eigenvalue data to mean values of randomized alternative matrices (Hayton, Allen, & 
Scarpello, 2004) indicated a three-factor solution when the more conservative 95
th
 
percentile comparison of parallel matrix means is employed (Table 2).  
These differing indicators, coupled with the large amount of variance accounted 
for by the first factor, made the decision about extraction a difficult and somewhat 
ambiguous one. Ultimately, given the results of the parallel analysis and the fact that the 
initial eigenvalue for the fourth factor only slightly exceeded the cutoff of 1, the decision 
was made to extract three factors from the data. This choice was also made in 
consideration of the research‟s stated goal of examining the data for interpretable focus of 
attention and affective-valence factors, which would have been difficult or impossible if a 
one or two-factor extraction had been chosen.  
A factor analysis specifying a three-factor model was then performed using 
Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization. A summary of the factor loadings, 
eigenvalues, and commonalities for the rotated solution is presented in Table 3. With 
regard to factor loadings, Items 4 (My eyes are wandering all over the room) and 14 
(They think I am talking too fast) were dropped for failing to load at .4 on any of the three  
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Figure 1. Scree plot for Maximum Likelihood factor analysis of 35 prospective Speaking 
Cognitions and Attention Scale items. 
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Table 2 
 
Parallel Analysis Results: Actual and Random Eigenvalues (N = 367) 
 
Actual Eigenvalue  Average Eigenvalue 95
th
 Percentile Eigenvalue 
 
  16.37    .74    .81 
 
    1.90    .65    .72 
 
      .81    .59    .65 
 
      .56    .54    .59 
 
      .48    .49    .53 
 
      .39     .45    .49 
 
      .37    .41    .45 
 
      .25    .37                          .41 
Note. Boldface indicates actual eigenvalues which are larger than 95
th
 percentile 
eigenvalues, indicating a factor is appropriate for retention.  
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Table 3 
 
Summary of Rotated Factor Loadings for Varimax Three-Factor Solution for the 35 
Prospective Items for the Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale (N = 367)  
 
     Factor Loading 
 
Item   1  2  3  Communality 
 
1.   .38  .66  .12   .60 
 
2.   .35  .48  .41   .51 
 
3.   .32  .74  .13   .66 
 
4.   .08  .39  .22   .20 
 
5.   .66  .32  .20   .57 
 
6.   .37  .69  .26   .69 
 
7.   .33  .43  .44   .50 
 
8.   .65  .21  .32   .58 
 
9.   .16  .37  .13   .18 
 
10.   .41  .57  .34   .61 
 
11.   .16  .62  .39   .56 
 
12.   .36  .47  .55   .65 
 
13.   .71  .30  .31   .69 
 
14.   .18  .29  .29   .20 
 
15.   .24  .60  .36   .55 
 
16.   .44  .51  .46   .66 
 
17.   .70  .09  .28   .58 
 
18.   .36  .47  .29   .44 
Note. Boldface indicates highest factor loadings over minimum criteria of .4  (Table 3 
continues) 
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(Table 3 continued) 
 
     Factor Loading 
 
Item   1  2  3  Communality 
 
19.   .69  .14  .29   .57 
 
20.   .11  .54  .37   .44 
 
21.   .30  .62  .38   .62 
 
22.   .80  .31  .17   .77 
 
23.   .22  .52  .16   .35 
 
24.   .24  .51  .33   .42 
 
25.   .68  .49  .14   .71 
 
26.   .30  .37  .42   .42 
 
27.   .73  .47  .08   .75 
 
28.   .30  .37  .60   .52 
 
29.   .34  .44  .58   .65  
 
30.   .73  .32  .24   .70 
 
31.   .20  .43  .30   .32 
 
32.   .55  .34  .24   .48 
 
33.   .33  .56  .34   .54 
 
34.   .78  .24  .24   .72 
 
35.   .36  .31  .62   .61 
 
      Eigenvalues         7.54           7.23           4.21            
 
      % of variance    21.55         20.67         12.04             
 
Note. Boldface indicates highest factor loadings over minimum criteria of .4 
85 
 
  
 
remaining factors, and Item 7 (I look stiff as a board standing here) was dropped due to 
equal loadings on factor 2 and 3.  
Examination of item-total correlations revealed that the previously removed Items 
4 and 14 also did not meet the minimum item-total correlation of .5 needed for retention 
in the measure (Kline, 1986). Additionally, Item 9 (I hope I don’t stutter while speaking) 
did not meet this criterion and was dropped from the final measure. Finally, Item 31 (I 
keep fidgeting with my hands) was dropped because content of the item was judged to be 
more behavioral in nature and at odds with the study‟s goal of creating a cognitively-
focused measure of public speaking anxiety. Item total correlations for all 35 prospective 
SCAS items are presented in Table 4. 
Final measure characteristics. The deletion of Items 4, 7, 9, 14, and 31 resulted in 
a 30 item final measure. Since all responses were made on a 0 to 4 scale, with 0 
indicating that the cognition is “never” present and 4 indicating that the cognition is 
“always” present, potential total scores on this measure range from 0 to 120. The 11 
measure items with positive or facilitative content (Items 5, 8, 13, 17, 19, 22, 25, 27, 30, 
32, and 34) were reverse-coded so that higher total scores on the final measure indicate 
greater public speaking anxiety. The mean total score on the measure for the sample was 
found to be 49.7, with a standard deviation of 22.7. Furthermore, total scores on the 
measure were normally distributed around the mean, indicating that the scale does not 
demonstrate floor or ceiling effects. Item-total correlations for the measure ranged from 
.56 to .81, indicating that each of the 30 measure items is strongly related to the overall 
score.  
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Table 4 
 
Corrected Item-Total Correlations for the 35 Prospective Items for the Speaking 
Cognitions and Attention Scale (N = 367)  
         Corrected Item-Total 
Item                   Correlation 
 
1. I feel anxious giving this speech.      .69 
  
2. I look stupid to the audience.      .69 
 
3. I am starting to feel uneasy.      .71 
 
4. My eyes are wandering all over the room.     .40 
 
5. The audience sees that I am calm.*     .68 
 
6. I am scared of this entire situation.      .78 
 
7. I look stiff as a board standing here.     .67 
 
8. I think I‟m doing well.*       .66 
 
9. I hope I don‟t stutter while speaking.     .40 
 
10. They can see that I am anxious.      .77 
 
11. My body feels really hot.       .67 
 
12. I sound stupid talking to these people.     .77 
 
13. I look confident standing up here.*     .75 
 
14. They think I am talking too fast.      .43 
 
15. I am trembling standing up here.      .69 
 
16. The audience can tell that I am afraid.     .79  
 
17. They think I am doing well.*      .60 
 
18. My voice sounds timid.       .65 
 
19. I am doing well with the speech.*     .62 
 
Note: * denotes reverse-scored item.     (Table 4 continues)  
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(Table 4 continued) 
         Corrected Item-Total 
Item                   Correlation 
 
20. This speech is making me sweat.      .58 
 
21. I am panicking; I want to get out of here.     .75 
 
22. I look comfortable giving this speech.*     .74 
 
23. I hope I don‟t look stupid in front of these people.   .55 
 
24. I‟m going to freeze up.       .61 
 
25. I am comfortable giving this speech.*     .77 
 
26. They can see that I am uncomfortable.     .61 
 
27. I am calm while standing in front of this audience.*    .76 
 
28. The speech I am giving is horrible.     .62 
 
29. I look stiff to the audience.      .75 
 
30. I am confident with my performance.*     .74 
 
31. I keep fidgeting with my hands.      .54 
 
32. This isn‟t so bad.*        .64 
 
33. I am uncomfortable giving this speech.     .71 
 
34. I look confident to them.*       .71 
 
35. The audience sees that I am doing a bad job.    .69 
 
Note: * denotes reverse-scored item. 
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SCAS factor loadings. With regard to factor structure, the rotated matrix of the 
items comprising the final measure contains three factors. A summary of the items 
comprising each factor and their loadings, excluding the dropped items, is presented in 
Table 5. The first factor, which accounts for 21% of the total variance, is composed of the 
11 reverse-coded positive items (Items 5, 8, 13, 17, 19, 22, 25, 27, 30, 32, and 34). Since 
the content of all these items reflect facilitative cognitions with respect to the speaking 
task (e.g. Item 5: The audience sees that I am calm; Item 13: I look confident standing up 
here) this factor will henceforth be referred to as Positive Performance Cognitions (PPC). 
Cronbach‟s alpha reliability analysis indicated that the PPC subscale displayed a 
reliability coefficient of .95, indicating excellent internal reliability (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). The second factor, which accounts for 20% of the total variance, is 
composed of 14 items (Items 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 33) that 
reflect mild to moderately negative cognitions about public speaking (e.g. Item 1: I feel 
anxious giving this speech; Item 18: My voice sounds timid) and will be referred to as 
Negative Performance Cognitions (NPC). Cronbach‟s alpha reliability analysis indicated 
that the NPC subscale displayed a reliability coefficient of .87, indicating good to 
excellent internal reliability (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). The third factor, which 
accounts for 10% of the total variance, is composed of 5 items (Items 12, 26, 28, 29, and 
35) reflecting cognitions about speaking performance that are more markedly negative 
and judgmental than those contained in the Negative Performance Cognitions factor (e.g. 
Item 28: The speech I am giving is horrible; Item 35: The audience sees that I am doing a 
bad job) and will be referred to as Catastrophic Performance Cognitions (CPC). 
Cronbach‟s alpha reliability analysis indicated that the CPC subscale displayed a  
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Table 5 
 
Factor Loadings for Varimax Three-Factor Solution for 30 Retained Speaking 
Cognitions and Attention Scale Items 
          Factor 
   Item       Loading 
 
  Factor 1: Positive Performance Cognitions 
 
5. The audience sees that I am calm.      .66 
 
8. I think I‟m doing well.       .65 
 
13. I look confident standing up here.     .71 
 
17. They think I am doing well.      .70 
 
19. I am doing well with the speech.      .69 
 
22. I look comfortable giving this speech.     .80 
 
25. I am comfortable giving this speech.     .68 
 
27. I am calm while standing in front of this audience.   .73 
 
30. I am confident with my performance.     .73 
 
32. This isn‟t so bad.        .55 
 
34. I look confident to them.       .78 
 
  Factor 2: Negative Performance Cognitions 
 
1. I feel anxious giving this speech.      .66 
 
2. I look stupid to the audience.      .48 
 
3. I am starting to feel uneasy.      .74 
 
6. I am scared of this entire situation.      .69 
 
10. They can see that I am anxious.      .57 
 
11. My body feels really hot.       .62 
 
Note. N = 367 and α = .97 for entire measure.   (Table 5 continues)  
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(Table 5 continued) 
          Factor 
   Item       Loading 
 
  Factor 2: Negative Performance Cognitions 
 
15. I am trembling standing up here.      .60 
 
16. The audience can tell that I am afraid.     .51 
 
18. My voice sounds timid.       .47 
 
20. This speech is making me sweat.      .54 
 
21. I am panicking; I want to get out of here.     .62 
 
23. I hope I don‟t look stupid in front of these people.   .52 
 
24. I‟m going to freeze up.       .51 
 
33. I am uncomfortable giving this speech.     .56 
 
  Factor 3: Catastrophic Performance Cognitions  
 
12. I sound stupid talking to these people.     .55 
 
26. They can see that I am uncomfortable.     .42 
 
28. The speech I am giving is horrible.     .60 
 
29. I look stiff to the audience.      .58 
 
35. The audience sees that I am doing a bad job.    .62 
 
Note. N = 367 and α = .97 for entire measure.
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reliability coefficient of .88, indicating good to excellent internal reliability (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). 
  Convergent and discriminant validity analytic strategy. After formulating the 
final 30 item measure, convergent and discriminant validity between total scores on this 
measure and the other administered measures was examined using Pearson‟s r bivariate 
correlations as measures of effect size. The accompanying measures administered in the 
study are designed to assess constructs with varying degrees of conceptual overlap with 
public speaking anxiety. The measure with the highest expected degree of common 
variance with the measure of interest is the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker 
(PRCS; Paul, 1966), which is also designed to measure public speaking anxiety. The Fear 
of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969) and Social Avoidance and 
Distress Scale (SADS; Watson & Friend, 1969) are measures of general social anxiety 
and are not specific to the public speaking task, and as such, should have a moderate 
degree of common variance with the measure of interest, in accordance with the 
prevailing conceptualization of public speaking anxiety as a specific form of generalized 
social anxiety (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  
The Public Self-Consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS) 
measures dispositional tendencies to focus attention on the self in public or social 
situations as a means of self-regulation. As discussed above, self-focused attention is 
theorized to play a key role in social and performance anxiety, and one of the goals of the 
present study is to incorporate focus of attention elements into assessing fears of public 
speaking. Therefore, this subscale is expected to share a moderate amount of common 
variance with the measure of interest. Finally, the private self-consciousness subscale of 
92 
 
 
the SCS measures the dispositional tendency to focus attention on the self for the 
purposes of insight or introspection. This construct does not share any conceptual 
similarity with public speaking anxiety, and it is expected to display a very low amount 
of common variance with the measure of interest to demonstrate the discriminant validity 
of the measure. A correlation matrix summarizing the observed relationships between the 
measures is presented in Table 6. 
Summary of Results 
 Hypothesis 1: Cronbach’s alpha estimates of internal reliability for the final 
measure in an undergraduate sample will fall into the good to excellent range of .80 to 
.95 as described by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). This hypothesis was confirmed. 
Cronbach‟s alpha internal reliability in the assessed population for the final 30-item 
Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale (SCAS) was calculated at α = .97, indicating an 
extremely high level of internal consistency (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
Hypothesis 2: The final measure will demonstrate strong convergent validity with 
the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (Paul, 1966), with an effect size in the 
high range of r ≥ .5 as described by Cohen (1988). This hypothesis was confirmed. 
Pearson‟s r bivariate correlation between PRCS and SCAS final measure total scores was 
calculated at .84, indicating a very high degree of common variance between the two 
scales. 
Hypothesis 3: The final measure will also demonstrate moderate convergent 
validity with the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969) and the 
Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), with an effect size falling 
in the moderate range of approximately .3 as described by Cohen (1988). This hypothesis 
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Table 6 
 
Correlation Matrix of Convergent and Discriminant Validity Measure Scores (N =367) 
 
 SCAS* FNE§ SCS Public**      SCAS PPC|     SCAS CPC± 
       PRCS^  SADS‡  SCS Private† SCAS NPC` 
               
 
 
SCAS - .84 .38 .44 .18  -.02 -.90 .95 .88 
 
PRCS  - .40 .47 .19            -.03 -.80 .78 .70 
 
FNE  - .51 .61 .26 -.31 .38 .37  
 
SADS  - .19 .07 -.42 .39 .39 
 
SCS Public  - .52 -.10 .22 .14 
 
SCS Private  - .05 .02 -.03 
 
SCAS PPC  - -.74 -.72  
 
SCAS NPC  - .81  
 
SCAS CPC  - 
Note. * Total score on 30-item Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale. ^ Total score on Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker Scale. § Total 
score on Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. ‡ Total score on Social Avoidance and Distress Scale. ** Subscale score on Self-Consciousness Scale – Public Self-
Consciousness subscale. † Subscale score on Self-Consciousness Scale – Private Self-Consciousness subscale. | Subscale score on Speaking Cognitions and 
Attention Scale – Positive Performance Cognitions subscale. ` Subscale score on Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale – Negative Performance Cognitions 
subscale. ± Subscale score on Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale – Catastrophic Performance Cognitions subscale. 
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was confirmed. The Pearson‟s r bivariate correlation between the FNE and the SCAS 
final measure total scores was calculated at .38, and the Pearson‟s r correlation between 
the SADS and the SCAS final measure total scores was calculated at .44. Both values 
reflect a moderate amount of common variance, and are substantially smaller in 
magnitude than the obtained correlation between the SCAS and PRCS.  
Hypothesis 4: The final measure will demonstrate moderate convergent validity 
with the public self-consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975), with an effect size in the moderate range of roughly r = .3 as 
described by Cohen (1988). This hypothesis was not confirmed. The Pearson‟s r 
correlation between scores on the public self-consciousness subscale of the SCS and total 
scores on the SCAS final measure was calculated at .18. This size of this effect is lower 
than hypothesized, and smaller in magnitude than the observed correlations between the 
SCAS and both the SADS and FNE. The obtained measurement better fits Cohen‟s 
(1988) classification of a “small” effect size. 
Hypothesis 5: The final measure will demonstrate discriminant validity with the 
private self-consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, 
& Buss, 1975), with an effect size in the trivial range of r < .1 as described by Cohen 
(1988). This hypothesis was confirmed. The Pearson‟s r correlation between scores on 
the private self-consciousness subscale of the SCS and total scores on the SCAS final 
measure was calculated at -.02, indicating a negligible effect size and little to no common 
variance between the two measures. This relationship is substantially smaller than that 
observed between the SCAS and all other measures employed in the study.      
 
95 
 
 
Exploratory Analyses 
 In order to further investigate the lack of focus of attention effects in the factor 
structure of the Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale in the current study, alpha 
reliability and convergent and discriminant validity were also calculated for subscales 
generated based on the ratings of attentional focus and affective valence made by trained 
raters prior to the data collection process. These analyses were performed to examine the 
possibility that grouping the final SCAS items based on combinations of attentional focus 
and affective valence might yield different relationships with the convergent validity 
variables, potentially suggesting effects of attentional focus not found in the main 
analyses. After excluding the five prospective items not incorporated into the final 
measure, the four subscales were as follows: self-focused, negative items, consisting of 
Items 1, 3, 6, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 24, 28, and 33; self-focused, positive items, 
consisting of Items 8, 13, 19, 22, 25, 27, 30, and 32; other-focused, negative items, 
consisting of Items 2, 10, 16, 23, 26, 29, and 35; and other-focused, positive items, 
consisting of Items 5, 17, and 34.  
Cronbach‟s alpha reliability analyses indicated that the self-focused, negative and 
the self-focused, positive subscales displayed identical reliability statistics of .93, 
indicating excellent internal reliability for both. Internal reliability for the other-focused, 
negative items was calculated at .87, indicating „good‟ reliability. Finally, the other-
focused, positive items displayed a reliability of .82, also indicating „good‟ reliability. 
The shorter length of the other-focused, positive subscale likely accounts for some of the 
lowered reliability in comparison to the other subscales. 
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Convergent and discriminant validity analyses were repeated, again examining 
Pearson‟s r correlations as measures of effect size. Correlations between all four 
subscales, the SCAS total score, and the convergent and discriminant validity measures 
are presented in matrix form in Table 7. Examination of the correlations reveals that each 
of the four subscales correlates with the convergent validity measures in a pattern highly 
similar to that observed with the SCAS total score in the main study; with the highest 
observed correlations with the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker, moderate 
correlations with the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale and the Social Avoidance and 
Distress Scale, small-to-moderate correlations with the public self-consciousness 
subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale, and extremely small correlations with the 
private self-consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale. The effect sizes for 
each of these correlations display a high degree of similarity to those observed with the 
SCAS total score, with the exception of lower correlations between the public self-
consciousness subscale of the SCS and the other-focused, positive and self-focused, 
positive SCAS subscales. 
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Table 7 
 
Exploratory Analysis: Correlation Matrix of Convergent and Discriminant Validity Measure Scores (N = 367) 
 
 SCAS* SCAS OP`     SCAS ON{}      FNE§  SCS Public**      
      SCAS SP|       SCAS SN±      PRCS^     SADS                          SCS Private† 
               
 
 
SCAS - -.90 -.80 .95 .94  .84 .38 .44 .18 -.02 
 
SCAS SP  - .86 -.75 -.76            -.80 -.31 -.42 -.11 .04  
 
SCAS OP  - -.63 -.69 -.71 -.27 -.37 -.06 .06  
 
SCAS SN  - .90 .78 .37 .40 .19 -.01 
 
SCAS ON  - .76 .40 .42 .20 .00 
 
PRCS  - .40 .47 .19 -.03 
 
FNE  - .51 .61 .26  
 
SADS  - .76 .07  
 
SCS Public        - .52 
 
SCS Private         - 
Note. * Total score on 30-item Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale. ^ Total score on Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker Scale. § Total score on 
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. ‡ Total score on Social Avoidance and Distress Scale. ** Subscale score on Self-Consciousness Scale – Public Self-
Consciousness subscale. † Subscale score on Self-Consciousness Scale – Private Self-Consciousness subscale. | Subscale score on Speaking Cognitions and 
Attention Scale – Self-focused Positive Items. ` Subscale score on Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale – Other-focused Positive Items.  ± Subscale score on 
Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale – Self-focused Negative Items. {} Subscale score on Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale – Other-focused 
Negative Items
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Discussion 
 
Summary of Results 
 
 The present study utilized an exploratory factor analysis of an initial sample of 35 
empirically-generated prospective questionnaire items to create the Speaking Cognitions 
and Attention Scale (SCAS), a 30-item self-report measure of public speaking anxiety. 
The internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity properties of the final 
scale were also examined. Results indicated that the SCAS has a 3- factor structure and 
displays excellent internal reliability and strong item-total correlations. Convergent 
validity analyses with other self-report measures largely followed the hypothesized 
pattern, with a high correlation found between the SCAS and another measure of public 
speaking anxiety, moderate correlations between the SCAS and two measures of 
generalized social anxiety, and no statistical relationship with a measure of introspection 
that is theoretically unrelated to public speaking anxiety. However, the statistical 
relationship between the SCAS and a measure of self-focused attention in public 
situations was not as large as hypothesized. 
Implications of Obtained Results 
Item Elimination Process 
 The first goal of the current study was selecting self-statement items for the final 
measure from the initial pool of 35 prospective items administered to all participants. 
Items were selected for inclusion using criteria suggested by Kline (1986), namely, 
clearly loading on one factor at .4 or higher and displaying an item-total correlation of .5 
or higher. Selection of these criteria was intended to increase the likelihood that the 
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resulting final SCAS measure would display a clear factor structure and a high degree of 
specificity for the measurement of public speaking anxiety. 
 The selection process eliminated 5 of the prospective items, leaving a 30-item 
final measure. Three items (Item 4: My eyes are wandering all over the room, Item 7: I 
look stiff as a board standing here, and Item 14: They think I am talking too fast) were 
dropped for failing to meet the predetermined criteria for factor loading. A fourth item 
(Item 9: I hope I don’t stutter while speaking) was removed for failing to correlate with 
the total at .5 or higher. Finally, a fifth item was removed (Item 31: I keep fidgeting with 
my hands) because its content was judged to be more reflective of a behavior than a 
cognition, and thus, at odds with the intent of the scale. 
 The fact that only a modest percentage (14.3%) of the 35 prospective items was 
removed during the selection process suggests that the naturalistic thought-sampling 
process used to generate these items was successful in measuring a narrow and consistent 
domain of interest. Furthermore, the strong item-total correlations and defined 3-factor 
structure found in the final 30-item SCAS measure provide a positive indication that 
empirically sampled cognitive self-statements can be translated into a cohesive scale with 
relatively little modification. In all, the process of constructing the final SCAS scale and 
the resulting output appears to lend support to the claims of cognitive assessment theory 
(Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, 
& Larsen, 1982) as well as the viability of the current study‟s goal of using empirical 
methods to create a measure of public speaking anxiety. 
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SCAS Internal Characteristics 
Another aim of the current research is the acquisition of initial data on the 
reliability of the final 30-item iteration of the SCAS. The high Cronbach‟s alpha internal 
reliability estimate of α = .97 obtained for the SCAS in the sample demonstrates that 
participant responses on the 30 items comprising the scale exhibited highly consistent 
patterns with one another. This provides a strong indicator that the SCAS measure items 
represent a specific construct (Streiner, 2003). High internal reliability estimates have 
traditionally been viewed as a prerequisite for the use of a psychometric instrument for 
research and clinical purposes (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
 Some authors (e.g. Kline, 1986; Streiner, 2003) have advanced the argument that 
very high Cronbach‟s alpha internal reliability scores of .90 and above may actually be 
harmful to the content validity of a measure if attained by utilizing items that measure 
only one aspect of a construct at the expense of other important dimensions. In the case 
of the SCAS, however, the measure was specifically conceived to focus narrowly on 
speaking-anxiety related cognitions, based on the emphasis placed on the causal role of 
cognitive factors in contemporary models of the construct (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), as well as the work of psychometric theorists (e.g. Glass & 
Arnkoff, 1997; Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997) who emphasize the external 
validity benefits of creating highly specific cognitively-focused measures of 
psychological constructs. Therefore, the very large Cronbach‟s alpha obtained in the 
current study may be a positive indication that the SCAS has fulfilled the original 
intention of specifically measuring speaking-anxiety related cognitions. 
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SCAS Factor Structure and Affective Valence 
 An exploratory factor analytic procedure indicated a three-factor solution for the 
items on the SCAS (Table 5). Examination of the items comprising each factor indicated 
that within each factor, items appeared to be grouped according to affective valence. The 
Positive Performance Cognitions (PPC) factor grouped together facilitative thoughts 
about the speaking situation and the likelihood of performance success, typified by 
thoughts about “doing well,” “being calm,” and “looking comfortable.” The Negative 
Performance Cognitions (NPC) factor delineated debilitative, anxiety-related cognitions, 
typified by thoughts about “being anxious,” “feeling hot,” and “sounding timid.” The 
Catastrophic Performance Cognitions (CPC) factor collected items reflecting cognitions 
which were more markedly negative and judgmental than the NPC factor, typified by 
thoughts of “looking stupid,” “doing a bad job,” and “giving a horrible speech.”  
The identification of three separate affective valence factors  within the sample is 
somewhat contrary to expectations, as the majority of theoretical and empirical work on 
anxiety processes and cognitive assessment (e.g. Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; 
Carver, 2006; Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993) emphasizes a 
straightforward distinction between positively and negatively valenced emotions. The 
current data suggests that with regard to speaking anxiety, a qualitative distinction may 
exist between negative thoughts that refer to basic anxiety-related concerns and those that 
refer to directly to negative evaluation by others or extremely poor social performance. It 
should be noted that the functional aspects of a more straightforward positive-negative 
distinction appear to be essentially preserved within the sample, with the PPC factor 
correlating with less anxiety on the PRCS and SADS and both the NPC and CPC factors 
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correlating with more anxiety on these measures (Table 6). This lends credence to the 
notion that positively-valenced cognitions are associated with facilitation of speaking 
performance and negatively-valenced cognitions are associated with debilitation of 
speaking performance, although the data in the current study is limited by a lack of 
behaviorally specific dependant variables.  
Potential implications of CPC factor. Although it is currently unclear why the 
items constituting the Catastrophic Performance Cognitions factor on the SCAS were 
found to be a distinct factor rather than being subsumed under the Negative Performance 
Cognitions factor, a few potential explanations can be advanced. The most 
straightforward possibility is that the CPC items tap into a qualitatively different variant 
of public speaking anxiety than do the NPC items. As previously discussed, public 
speaking anxiety is the most common form of social anxiety, with up to a third of 
Americans reporting a significant degree of anxiety or avoidance regarding speaking in 
public (Kessler, Stein, & Berglund, 1998). Within this population, however, only 30% 
may meet diagnostic criteria for a DSM diagnosis of Social Phobia. The distinction 
between clinical and subclinical experiences of social anxiety typically implies that the 
former involves more severe experiences of anxiety and avoidance and more pervasive 
fears of being negatively evaluated by others (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; 
Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 1993). Since the CPC factor is largely constituted of 
items which explicitly address negative evaluation of speaking performance, endorsement 
of these items may indicate greater concerns about being negatively evaluated and a 
higher likelihood of meeting criteria for a Social Phobia diagnosis. 
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Unfortunately, the currently available data is insufficient to draw strong 
conclusions regarding the validity of this interpretation. Convergent validity analyses 
(Table 6) indicate that the scores on the CPC factor are not more highly correlated with 
total scores on the SAD, PRCS, or FNE scales when compared with scores on the PPC  
or NPC factors. Although this would seem to indicate that endorsement of items on the 
Catastrophic Performance Cognitions factor is not associated with more severe anxiety, 
broader support is needed before making a substantive conclusion to this effect. 
Specifically, correlating the SCAS with more specific behavioral data, such as participant 
ratings following in vivo exposure and assessment of functional impairment reflecting the 
DSM-IV criteria for Social Phobia, specific type, would be a more externally valid test 
than the self-report measures employed in the current study, and would likely yield more 
robust results.  
A second potential explanation for the identification of two distinct negatively-
valenced factors in the current study addresses the process of experiencing and 
interpreting positive and negative emotional experiences while speaking in public. As 
noted above, popular cognitive models of social anxiety, such as the one proposed by 
Clark and Wells (1995), focus on the role that attention to internal and external feedback 
plays in creating and sustaining the anxiety response. Positive affective experiences, such 
as feeling confident or receiving praise from others, are thought to indicate good social 
performance, while negative affective experiences, such as experiencing anxiety 
symptoms or being criticized by others, are thought to indicate poor social performance 
and increased likelihood of negative evaluation by others. In situations where negative 
evaluations by others appear possible or likely, these theories predict that individuals will 
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be more attuned to negative experiences that constitute internal and external signifiers of 
poor performance.  
Given that public speaking is widely perceived as a threatening or anxiety-
provoking task, individuals in the general population may be more attuned to subtleties 
and variations in negative affective experiences related to speaking in public because of 
the greater importance of these experiences in providing anxiety-related feedback. If this 
is indeed the case, then this phenomenon may have informed the distinct response 
patterns that resulted in the Negative and Catastrophic Performance Cognitions factors 
observed in the current sample. By contrast, individuals may be less predisposed to attend 
to variations in positive affective experiences in public speaking, possibly because such 
experiences may generally signify “performing well enough.” If so, this may account for 
the single SCAS Positive Performance Cognitions factor observed in the current sample. 
SCAS Factor Structure and Focus of Attention 
 Contrary to one of the stated goals of the current research, exploratory factor 
analysis did not indicate that focus of attention played a role in the factor structure of the 
SCAS in the current sample. One of the intended functions of the scale was to provide a 
means of measuring the relative contributions of self- and other-focused attention in 
public speaking anxiety in a retrospective self-report questionnaire. While the role of 
self-focused attention in exacerbating social and performance anxiety has been discussed 
thoroughly in both the theoretical (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1996) and empirical (Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993; Melchior & 
Cheek, 1990; Monfries & Kafer, 1994; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000) 
literatures, the attempt made by the current research to measure this construct as an 
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underlying factor in the SCAS does not appear to have met with success, as evidenced by 
the lack of discernable focus of attention elements in the factor structure of measure 
responses, as well as the lack of observed differences in the magnitude of convergent 
validity correlations between items judged to be self-focused and those judged to be 
other-focused indicated by exploratory analyses.  
Several potential explanations can be advanced as to why this is the case. One 
possibility might be flaws in the manner in which focus of attention was conceptualized 
and evaluated in the in-vivo speaking cognitions that formed the basis for the measure 
items. This process equated focus of attention with the subjective personal pronouns 
employed in the cognition, so that use of words such as “I” or “my” was interpreted to 
denote self-focused attention, while use of words such as “they” or “these people” was 
interpreted to denote other-focused attention. However, within the parameters of the 
thought-listing method employed in this previous research, there is no conclusive way of 
determining if an individual‟s word choice with regard to the subjective personal pronoun 
provides an accurate reflection of his or her attentional focus while experiencing the 
cognition. It is possible that variance in word choice might simply be an individual 
difference with no bearing on attention at all. If this is the case, then the assumption that 
elements reflecting focus of attention were present in the SCAS items is likely to have 
been a faulty one. 
A second potential explanation for the lack of a perceptible attentional focus 
factor in the SCAS sample responses may involve biases inherent to the retrospective 
format of the SCAS as it was administered in the current sample. Before responding to 
the questions, sample participants were instructed to “think back to the last several times” 
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they gave public speeches and base their responses to the SCAS items on their recall of 
these experiences. As such, participant responses are subject to retrospective biases that 
might have significantly impacted the ability of the items to reflect certain aspects of the 
actual experience of speaking in public. 
 Two observations raise the strong possibility that focus of attention elements may 
be at particular risk to have been obscured by recall biases in the present study. The first 
is that attention tends to be a fluid process, with frequent shifts being a natural aspect of 
ordinary consciousness. As a result, changes in attention may be less subjectively 
remarkable than changes in affect, which tend to be less common and are more widely 
recognized to have a salient impact on current functioning. Thus, individuals may be less 
likely to recognize or recall the fact that their attentional processes underwent a shift 
upon entering a public speaking situation, while retaining memories of positive or 
negative emotional experiences.  
Secondly, the general lack of conscious awareness paid to focus of attention likely 
results in a decreased likelihood that individuals will habitually attempt to self-regulate 
their attentional processes, particularly in a cognitively demanding situation such as 
speaking in public. The fact that focus of attention has been effectively manipulated in 
experimental contexts using relatively simple interventions such as placing mirrors in 
front of the subject (Scheier & Carver, 1983), mandating a particular type of speech 
content (Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000), and providing mock heart-rate 
feedback (Pineles & Mineka, 2005) may speak to the lack of conscious effort most 
individuals place upon maintaining control of these processes. Since self-regulation 
processes appear to be particularly significant in goal-directed social behaviors such as 
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public speaking, elements such as focus of attention that are not consciously regulated 
may be less salient when respondents attempt to reconstruct their speaking-related 
cognitive processes, making retrospective assessment more difficult. 
A third possibility is that the failure to identify SCAS focus of attention factors in 
the current sample may simply indicate that focus of attention in public speaking anxiety 
does not display an orthogonal relationship to affective valence at the underlying factor 
level. Although this may appear to be at odds with empirical findings supporting a 
distinct role of self-focused attention in social anxiety (Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 
1993; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000), Clark and Wells‟ 
(1995) cognitive model of social anxiety can support a conceptualization that 
accommodates both the present findings and those of previous studies. In this model, 
anxiety in public speaking situations initially manifests as an affectively-valenced 
cognitive response to the likelihood of negative evaluation by the audience. Changes in 
attentional focus follow in response to this affective experience, and can serve to prolong 
or attenuate anxiety depending on the elements which are focused upon more heavily. 
The temporal sequence implies that the affective valence of cognitions is the primary 
influence on public speaking anxiety, and that the focus of these cognitions is a 
secondary process which may mainly influence the course of the anxiety experience.  
Given the results of the current study, this reading of Clark and Wells‟ (1995) 
model could suggest that focus of attention may display different effects within the 
identified Positive, Negative, or Catastrophic cognitions, rather than displaying a general 
orthogonal relationship to affective valence. In other words, focus of attention could 
display significantly different effects depending on the particular affective valence of the 
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cognition; for instance, self-focused negative cognitions might prolong an anxiety 
response specifically through enhanced sensitivity to physiological responses, while self-
focused positive cognitions might lessen anxiety by directly promoting a subjective sense 
of competence or efficacy.  If this is the case, it may suggest that focus of attention 
effects depend on an interaction with affective valence that was not adequately captured 
in the SCAS items, and may be difficult or impossible to measure through self-report 
item in general. 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity of SCAS Total Scores 
 The SCAS was designed in accordance with theories of cognitive assessment 
(e.g. Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Glass, Merluzzi, 
Biever, and Larsen, 1982) which hold that cognitions associated with particular 
constructs can be used as items to create valid measures of these constructs. As such, 
finding initial support for the validity of the SCAS in measuring public speaking anxiety 
was another central goal of the current research. Within the current study, the outcome 
measures employed to test convergent validity hypotheses were other self-report 
measures of public speaking and social anxiety, specifically the Personal Report of 
Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS; Paul, 1966), the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; 
Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS; 
Watson & Friend, 1969), and the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & 
Friend, 1969).  
While public speaking anxiety has been conceptualized (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and empirically studied (Rodebaugh & Rapee, 2005; Wald & 
Rodriguez, 2005; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000) from theoretical 
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perspectives originally formulated to explain general interaction anxiety, it also displays 
unique and distinguishing characteristics. Clinically, public speaking anxiety is 
conceptualized as a specific subtype of Social Phobia in the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994), and the prevalence of any form of anxiety is higher in 
public speaking situations than in general interaction situations (Kessler, Stein, & 
Berglund, 1998). The fact that many individuals who report significant anxiety while 
speaking in public do not suffer anxiety in other social contexts (Pollard & Henderson, 
1988) suggests that elements unique to the speaking situation or more pronounced within 
it are particularly anxiety-provoking. This is a particularly important point in the current 
study, as one of the main dictates of cognitive assessment (Clark, 1988; Glass & Arnkoff, 
1994; Heimberg, 1994) is that the measure should display a high degree of situational 
specificity with the construct of interest. This study utilized a variety of general and 
specific convergent validity measures to assess whether the pattern of associations these 
measures exhibited with the SCAS matched a profile consistent with the construct of 
public speaking anxiety.  
To do so, Pearson‟s r correlations were calculated between each discriminant 
validity measure and the SCAS. The correlations were interpreted as measures of effect 
size to facilitate comparisons regarding the magnitude of shared variance between the 
SCAS and the other measures. The PRCS (Paul, 1966) displayed the largest amount of 
shared variance with the SCAS in the current sample. Since the PRCS was the only 
specific public speaking anxiety measure included in the current study, the level of 
statistical similarity augurs well for the ability of the SCAS to measure public speaking 
anxiety. More moderate amounts of shared variance were observed with the FNE and the 
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SADS (Watson & Friend, 1969), which respectively measure cognitive and behavioral 
aspects of general social anxiety. This result again matches expectations for the SCAS, as 
general social anxiety is thought to be closely related to, but not synonymous with, the 
processes involved in public speaking anxiety. 
The effect size of the observed correlation between the SCAS and the public self-
consciousness subscale of the SCS (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) was lower than 
expected. This subscale measures tendencies to focus on the self in social situations, a 
construct that has demonstrated associations with social anxiety processes in the past 
(Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Woody, 1996; Woody & 
Rodriguez, 2000). However, the effect size of the association between the SCAS and the 
private self-consciousness subscale of the SCS was not significantly different from zero. 
This finding was consistent with expectations and demonstrates the discriminant validity 
of the SCAS, since the construct of private self-consciousness is theoretically unrelated to 
public speaking or other forms of social anxiety. 
In general terms, the overall pattern of correlations supports the specificity of the 
SCAS in measuring public speaking anxiety. The main point of departure from prediction 
is the small size of the effect between the SCAS and the public self-consciousness 
subscale of the SCS, which suggests that self-focusing tendencies do contribute to 
variance in SCAS item responses, but that the contribution is relatively small. This 
finding is particularly interesting in light of the previously discussed failure to identify 
focus of attention elements in the factor structure of the SCAS, and provides further 
evidence that the ability of the SCAS to measure focus of attention in public speaking 
anxiety may be limited in key ways. Alternatively, the size of this effect may be due to 
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the format of the study and general difficulties in conducting empirical investigation into 
attentional focus using retrospective measures. Further research is needed to clarify the 
factors involved in the relationship between attentional focus, speaking anxiety, and 
measurement with the SCAS. 
Comparison with Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker 
 As previously mentioned, the current study intended to create a measure of public 
speaking anxiety with a more clearly defined theoretical and empirical basis than existing 
measures of the construct. The potential advantages of the SCAS in this regard can be 
discussed by drawing a detailed contrast with the Personal Report of Confidence of a 
Speaker (Paul, 1966). The PRCS provides an excellent point of comparison with the 
SCAS because it is an established and frequently used self-report measure of public 
speaking anxiety (Philips, Jones, Rieger, & Snell, 1997) and because it was administered 
alongside the SCAS in the current sample as one of the main convergent validity 
measures.  
A high correlation of .87 was obtained in the current sample between the SCAS 
and PRCS. As previously discussed, this degree of overlap is a good indicator of the 
specificity and convergent validity of the SCAS, since the PRCS has demonstrated 
relationships with public speaking anxiety in previous studies (Beck, et al., 2005; Paul, 
1966; Wald & Rodriguez, 2005). However, it also raises valid questions about whether or 
not the SCAS is functionally redundant with the PRCS in terms of its utility for 
measuring and conceptualizing public speaking anxiety. A closer examination of the 
differences in how the two scales were formulated and how each measures the construct 
allows a clearer distinction to be drawn. 
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Differences in formulation and item content. One of the largest differences 
between the SCAS and PRCS is the method used to formulate each measure. The 30 item 
PRCS in question (Paul, 1966) is actually a selection of the items from Gilkinson‟s 
(1942) original 104-item Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker that were found to 
have the greatest discriminant validity in identifying low and high speech-anxious 
individuals. In turn, Gilkinson‟s (1942) items were generated solely by the author to be 
face-valid in representing various degrees of fear and confidence in speaking at different 
time periods relative to the speaking task. Paul‟s (1966) 30-item PRCS reflects this 
diversity of foci, containing items that assess behaviors (Item 2, My hands tremble when I 
try to handle objects on the platform), items that assess reactions before (Item 24, I 
perspire and tremble just before getting up to speak), during (Item 26, I am fearful and 
tense all the while I am speaking before a group of people), and after speaking (Item 6, At 
the conclusion of a speech, I feel that I have had a pleasant experience), as well as items 
that reflect personal preferences regarding aspects of the speaking situation (Item 13, I 
prefer to have notes on the platform in case I forget my speech).  In contrast, the SCAS 
items were generated from the self-reported cognitions of undergraduate students 
engaging in an in-vivo public speaking situation and focus narrowly on cognitive self-
statements made about an ongoing speaking situation (e.g. Item 20, This speech is making 
me sweat). Cognitive assessment theory (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; Glass & 
Arnkoff, 1994; Glass, et al., 1982) suggests that using naturalistic items and taking a 
narrower focus on in-vivo cognitions produces a more valid measurement of 
psychological constructs, particularly for constructs such as social and performance 
anxiety in which cognitions have been demonstrated to play a large role in the larger 
113 
 
 
response (Alden, Bieling, and Wallace, 1994; Ayers, 1988; Beazley, Glass, Chambless, & 
Arnkoff, 2001; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, and Dombeck, 1990; Mahone, Bruch, & 
Heimberg, 1993). 
Comparison of internal characteristics. The fact that the SCAS correlated very 
highly with the PRCS despite the markedly narrower focus of the SCAS items is 
consistent with the claim of cognitive assessment theory that specific measurement of 
cognitive elements can capture relevant variance in speaking anxiety. A comparison of 
Cronbach‟s alpha internal reliability statistics obtained for the SCAS and PRCS in the 
sample indicates a value of α = .90 for the PRCS and a value of α = .97 for the SCAS. 
Although both of these values indicate excellent internal reliability (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994), the higher reliability estimate for the SCAS may be an indicator that the 
measure has met its goal of measuring a more narrow and specific element of the public 
speaking anxiety experience (Streiner, 2003). With regard to item composition, item-total 
correlations (Table 8) in the current sample for nine PRCS items (Items 4, 13, 14, 17, 19, 
20, 23, 24, and 30) fell below the minimum criteria of .5 suggested by Kline (1986), and 
the highest observed item-total correlations were slightly above .6 (Items 6, 16, and 26). 
In comparison, all 30 SCAS items display item-total correlations above .5, with the 
highest observed correlations being slightly below .8 (Items 6, 12, 16, and 25). This 
indicates that on the whole, the SCAS items are more consistent with total scores than the 
PRCS items, and suggests that the SCAS items hold together better as a scale than do the 
PRCS items.    
Distributions in the current sample. A visual comparison of the distributions of 
total scores on the SCAS (Figure 2) and PRCS (Figure 3) in the current sample indicates  
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Table 8 
 
Corrected Item-Total Correlations for the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker 
(N = 367)  
         Corrected Item-Total 
Item                         Correlation 
 
1. I look forward to an opportunity to speak in public.*    .51 
2. My hands tremble when I try to handle objects on the platform.   .49 
3. I am in constant fear of forgetting my speech.     .54 
4. Audiences seem friendly when I address them.*     .32 
5. While preparing a speech, I am in a constant state of anxiety.    .46 
6. At the conclusion of a speech, I feel that I have had a pleasant experience. .61 
7. I dislike to use my body and voice expressively.     .43 
8. My thoughts become confused and jumbled when I speak before an audience. .60 
9. I have no fear of facing an audience.*      .52 
10. Although I am nervous just before getting up, I soon forget my fears  .55 
      and enjoy the experience.* 
 
11. I face the prospect of making a speech with complete confidence.*  .60 
12. I feel that I am in complete possession of myself while speaking.*  .58 
13. I prefer to have notes on the platform in case I forget my speech.  .20 
14. I like to observe the reactions of my audience to my speech.*   .35 
15. Although I talk fluently with friends I am at a loss for words on the platform. .55 
16. I feel relaxed and comfortable while speaking.*     .61 
17. Although I do not enjoy speaking in public, I do not particularly dread it.* .18 
Note. * denotes reverse-scored item.     (Table 8 continues) 
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(Table 8 continued) 
         Corrected Item-Total 
Item                          Correlation 
 
18. I always avoid speaking in public if possible.     .46 
 
19. The faces of my audience are blurred when I look at them.   .22 
 
20. I feel disgusted with myself after trying to address a group of people.  .27 
 
21. I enjoy preparing a talk.*        .55 
 
22. My mind is clear when I face an audience.*     .53 
 
23. I am fairly fluent.*        .33 
 
24. I perspire and tremble just before getting up to speak.    .41 
 
25. My posture feels strained and unnatural.      .50 
 
26. I am fearful and tense all the while I am speaking before a group of people. .62 
 
27. I find the prospect of speaking mildly pleasant.*     .51 
 
28. It is difficult for me to calmly search my mind for the right words.  .49 
      to express my thoughts. 
 
29. I am terrified at the thought of speaking before a group of people.  .58 
 
30. I have a feeling of alertness in facing an audience.*    .14 
 
Note. * denotes reverse-scored item.   
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Figure 2. Distribution of scores on the 30-item final Speaking Cognitions and Attention 
Scale in study sample (N = 367). Mean score is 49.7 (SD = 22.7). 
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Figure 3. Distribution of scores on the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker 
(PRCS; Paul, 1966) in study sample (N = 367). Mean score is 13.5 (SD = 7.2). 
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notable differences between the two measures. In the case of the PRCS, the mean score 
of 13.5 appears to be heavily influenced by a pronounced mode of 15 at the exact center. 
On each side of the mean, the distribution of scores is relatively flat around 10 
observations, with peaks at scores of 5, 10, 20, and 25. For the SCAS, the mode of 38 is 
not substantially more prominent in the distribution than the mean of 49.7, and the 
distribution of scores on either side of the mean is more graded than that found in the 
PRCS and more consistent with a bell-curve distribution. This distribution suggests that 
total scores on the SCAS may do a better job of measuring speaking anxiety as a 
continuous variable. This may be a manifestation of larger differences in how the two 
measures were conceptualized, with Paul (1966) designing his version of the PRCS to 
discriminate between low and high-anxious individuals using a variety of speaking-
related items and a dichotomous response format, while the SCAS was designed with a 
continuous response format to measure the presence and prevalence of specific anxiety-
related cognitions.  
Potential for future research applications. The current data indicate that the 
internal characteristics of the SCAS compare favorably to those of the PRCS. Pending 
further validation, this suggests that the SCAS is likely to be a useful tool in conducting 
cross-sectional correlational research on public speaking anxiety and screening 
individuals for public speaking fears. After further external validation using actual public 
speaking situations, the SCAS may prove to be more adaptable to experimental scenarios 
than the PRCS. While both scales conceive and measure public speaking anxiety as a 
stable trait, the specific focus on in-vivo cognitions in the SCAS may allow for the 
measure to be modified to measure cognitions in a specific speaking experience by 
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changing the directions to reflect this and altering the response format to be appropriate 
to the situation. Although doing so would necessitate that the scale be re-validated for 
this purpose, the SCAS items themselves would likely be highly transportable, as they are 
written in self-statement format. As noted above, the PRCS items tend to refer to general 
tendencies rather than specific responses, and would be comparatively less suitable for 
adaptation to the task of measuring state-specific public speaking anxiety. Should the 
SCAS be empirically demonstrated to be adaptable in such a fashion, it could be usefully 
employed as an outcome measure in future experimental research into public speaking 
anxiety. While past research has utilized subjective units of distress (SUDS) ratings 
(Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000) or customized rating scales (Savitsky & 
Gilovich, 2003) to make group comparisons, SCAS scores could potentially serve the 
same function with the added benefit of the increased construct specificity that 
empirically-based cognitive assessment methods provide (Glass & Arnkoff, 1994). The 
SCAS might also prove useful as a pretest-posttest measure of treatment changes, 
provided its sensitivity to change can be adequately established in controlled research. 
Potential for integration with speech-anxiety interventions. The unique properties 
of the SCAS relative to the PRCS may have additional benefits in non-research contexts 
where speech anxiety is a frequently encountered issue, such as clinical or educational 
settings. One of the strengths of the continuous response format utilized by the SCAS is 
that individual responses to the SCAS items can provide idiographic data about the 
relative prevalence of specific cognitions in an individuals‟ speaking experience, giving 
potentially important information about which cognitions contribute more to experiences 
of anxiety. By contrast, the dichotomous response format of the PRCS cannot provide 
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any information beyond whether or not the individual identifies with a particular scale 
item. The additional information provided by examining the profile of responses on the 
SCAS might be helpful in targeting educational or therapeutic interventions for speaking 
anxiety. For example, an individual may obtain a normatively high total score on the 
SCAS by endorsing that he or she „always‟ experiences thoughts of “freezing up,” 
“trembling,” and “sweating” during speaking, while reporting less frequent concerns 
related to the other negative thoughts on the scale. From this, the communication teacher 
or clinician can focus special effort on helping this individual reduce body-related 
concerns during speaking. In an explicitly clinically-focused setting, therapists might 
elect to use responses to the SCAS items as the basis for an exposure hierarchy to 
desensitize speech-anxious clients to specific performance concerns.    
A second aspect of the SCAS that may prove beneficial in applied settings is that 
the measure‟s exclusive focus on cognitions can provide a natural transition into 
cognitive reframing exercises, which have proven effective in reducing social anxiety 
(Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Heimberg, Dodge, Hope, Kennedy, Zollo, & Becker, 
1990). With regard to social anxiety treatment, cognitive reframing is a technique in 
cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy wherein a sufferer alters anxiety-provoking thoughts 
and assumptions by learning to identify and challenge them. For example, a speech-
anxious person who frequently thinks “I sound stupid talking to these people” might 
challenge this thought by with “Most people will recognize that I‟m doing the best I can, 
and won‟t hold a few slip-ups against me.”  Since the SCAS items, unlike the PRCS 
items, are written as first-person self-statements, they could easily be incorporated into 
exercises designed to teach reframing to speech-anxious individuals. After administering 
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the SCAS, a clinician or teacher might provide a speech-anxious person with basic 
instruction on the relationship between negative thoughts and anxiety, and follow with an 
exercise in which he or she generates relevant challenges to each of the negative 
cognitions endorsed on the SCAS. Additionally, the speech anxious individual could be 
coached into rehearsing thoughts in the SCAS Positive Performance Cognitions that may 
have been reported as being low-prevalence (e.g. Item 19; I am doing well with the 
speech) to increase confidence and reduce anxiety while speaking. An appropriately 
validated protocol of this type could be paired with the SCAS and standardized for use in 
university courses for students suffering from public speaking anxiety. Integrating 
assessment and intervention for public speaking anxiety-related cognitions in this fashion 
may help enable the creation of an empirically-validated treatment program for public 
speaking anxiety that can be administered by educators and other non-clinicians. Such a 
program might prove beneficial to individuals with mild to moderate levels of public 
speaking anxiety in overcoming their fears without the need for professional 
psychological intervention. 
Future Directions 
 Further validation of measure properties. Although the results of the current 
study give a positive initial indication for the reliability and convergent validity of the 
SCAS, further research is necessary for the instrument to be considered truly well-
validated. A clear initial concern is ensuring that the norms, distribution, validity 
correlations, and reliability observed in this sample are replicable in other populations. 
The future utility of the measure is highly dependent on its ability to retain good 
psychometric properties across a variety of contexts. The three-factor structure found in 
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the current analysis is of particular interest, since it may provide useful information about 
the underlying structure of public speaking anxiety and variations therein if it proves to 
be replicable. Re-administering the SCAS and the convergent validity measures to a 
larger sample with the intent of performing a confirmatory factor analysis on the data 
would be an important step toward meeting these goals.  
Establishment of clinical norms. In a similar vein, examining the properties of the 
SCAS in a population consisting solely of individuals who meet DSM-IV diagnostic 
criteria for Social Phobia (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) would aid greatly in 
providing clarification about how the measure performs in clinical populations. Such data 
would allow for an examination of the robustness of the SCAS factor structure in 
specifically speech-anxious populations, as well as helping to establish empirically-based 
clinical norms and cutoff scores for the measure, which are highly relevant for the future 
use of the measure in both research and treatment settings. A secondary question of 
interest in such a study might be a comparison in total scores and response patterns 
between individuals with a diagnosis of Social Phobia, generalized type and Social 
Phobia, specific type for public speaking anxiety. Such data might yield valuable 
information about whether or not the distinction between the subtypes translates to 
differences in the severity or presentation of anxiety experienced specifically in public 
speaking situations. 
External validity studies. Another critical step in validating the SCAS is 
establishing external validity by correlating SCAS total scores with direct measures of 
subject anxiety and confidence during an actual public speaking task. Ideally, such a 
study would administer the SCAS prior to a laboratory-controlled impromptu public 
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speaking task, similar to the one employed in the initial collection of the self-statements 
used as the basis for the SCAS items (Beck, Marin, Huber, & Rodriguez, 2005) and 
afterward collect participant self-ratings of anxiety and confidence experienced during 
the speech using a 0-100 Subjective Units of Distress scale. Such a study would serve the 
necessary purposes of establishing support for the predictive validity of the SCAS and 
providing further support for the construct validity of the measure in terms of its 
relationship to public speaking anxiety (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Administering the 
PRCS alongside the SCAS in such a study would provide another interesting point of 
comparison between the two measures with respect to predictive validity, and could 
potentially provide additional support for the general benefits of cognitive assessment 
measures.  
Focus of attention clarification. Experimental research might also be conducted to 
obtain a more focused examination of the role of focus of attention in the SCAS factor 
structure. As previously discussed, one potential explanation for the failure to find an 
expected focus of attention effect in the factor structure of the SCAS may be due to the 
effect of retrospective response biases. This theory could be tested by conducting an 
experimental study in which participants are randomly assigned to complete the SCAS 
either retrospectively or immediately after a public speaking task. Conducting 
exploratory factor analyses on the two sets of data for the purposes of comparison would 
provide a clear test of whether or not proximity to the speaking experience increases the 
sensitivity of the SCAS to focus of attention effects. Alternatively, examining the 
differences in SCAS total scores and factor structures between conditions in an 
experimental paradigm designed to manipulate focus of attention, such as that used by 
124 
 
 
Woody (1996) or Woody and Rodriguez (2000), may provide a more conclusive test of 
the relationship between focus of attention during public speaking and responses to the 
SCAS items. Replicating the factor structure of the SCAS under varied attentional focus 
conditions would be a positive indicator for the robustness of the measure, and could 
possibly contribute to a more detailed theoretical account of how focus of attention 
interacts with other elements in the public speaking experience. 
Possible clinical applications. Finally, the potential for integrating the SCAS into 
a standardized treatment protocol for public speaking anxiety is deserving of empirical 
study. Demonstrating the sensitivity of the SCAS in measuring changes in public 
speaking anxiety over time would constitute a positive initial step toward achieving this 
goal. This might be achieved by conducting a study in which speech anxious individuals 
undergo a treatment for public speaking anxiety using cognitive and behavioral methods, 
potentially similar to the group treatment utilized by Chambless, Tran, & Glass (1997). 
Administering the SCAS along with a public speaking anxiety behavioral test at pre-
treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up would provide important data regarding the 
ability of the SCAS to respond to treatment-influenced changes in speaking anxiety. 
Establishing sensitivity to change would expand the range of uses for the SCAS beyond 
screening and detection of public speaking anxiety to potential clinical research and 
treatment applications. Given the empirical fashion in which the SCAS was developed, 
the measure may evolve into a useful tool for validating emerging psychological 
treatments for public speaking anxiety or to evaluate treatment progress in individuals 
who are receiving clinical treatment for a diagnosis of social phobia, specific type. 
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With appropriate further validation, the SCAS could also be integrated into 
traditional individual psychotherapy for Social Phobia, specific type. Cognitive and 
cognitive-behavioral techniques for treatment of clinically significant anxiety are in wide 
use and have been supported with empirical evidence (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; 
Hofmann & Barlow, 2004). These treatments typically involve teaching anxious 
individuals to recognize and challenge their anxiety-provoking thoughts to reduce the 
severity of the anxiety, and exposing them repeatedly to the feared situation to reduce 
avoidance tendencies. Given the cognitive focus of the SCAS, a clinician beginning 
cognitive therapy for a severely speech-anxious individual could use the measure to 
engage the client in a discussion of why particular thoughts are more anxiety provoking 
than others during a speaking situation. After orienting the client to the therapy, the 
SCAS items could be incorporated into exercises designed to help the client learn to 
challenge the cognitions that are most relevant to his or her specific situation. For 
example, a client who identifies Item 16 (The audience can tell that I am afraid) as a 
frequently experienced cognition, might generate a cognitive challenge that states “most 
people won‟t be looking closely enough at me to give it much thought.”   
The SCAS might also prove clinically useful in encouraging the client to make 
the transition to the exposure tasks that are a critical component of the therapy (Hofmann 
& Barlow, 2004). A major issue in treatment of speaking anxiety is the difficulty of 
convincing anxious individuals to willingly expose themselves to speaking situations 
with sufficient frequency to allow for desensitization to occur (Rodebaugh & Chambless, 
2004). Therefore, encouragement and reinforcement of participation in exposure 
exercises is an important part of clinical treatment. To this end, the facilitative cognitions 
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assessed in the reverse-scored SCAS items might be useful in providing speech anxious 
clients with positive thoughts to rehearse before entering a speaking situation. For 
instance, if a client reports that he or she does not often experience the thought reflected 
in Item 19 (I’m doing well with the speech) this client could be instructed to rehearse this 
thought and employ it during exposure tasks as a method of anxiety control. In doing so, 
the therapist might point out to the client that facilitative thoughts can replace or limit the 
amount of debilitative, anxiety-causing thoughts that the client experiences, connecting 
the exposure and cognitively-based components of the treatment. 
Possible educational applications. In addition, since the SCAS was developed 
and initially validated using a general population sample, the measure might integrate 
well with a short-term, targeted treatment for individuals with subclinical public speaking 
anxiety. Given the high prevalence of speaking anxiety (Kessler, Stein, & Berglund, 
1998), there is likely to be a large demand for effective relief, particularly in educational 
settings where public speaking is required. One of the benefits of cognitive assessment 
measures such as the SCAS is the greater level of integration that is possible with 
cognitively-based interventions (Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Glass & Arnkoff, 1997; Glass, 
Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982) due to the focus on external validity. The development 
and pilot testing of a standardized school-based intervention that integrates SCAS 
screening, psychoeducation about the role of cognitions in speaking anxiety, cognitive-
reframing exercises, and speaking task exposure could lead to a method of efficiently and 
effectively addressing public speaking fears in this population without the need for 
professional psychotherapeutic intervention. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Summary and Conclusions 
 The current study successfully utilized exploratory factor analysis of responses 
made to 35 cognitive self-statements gathered in a previous study (Beck, et al., 2005) to 
form the Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale (SCAS), a 30-item measure of public 
speaking anxiety. Data indicates that in the current sample, the SCAS displays a 3-factor 
solution, reflecting items with positive, moderately negative, and extremely negative 
emotional content respectively. The measure also exhibits good initial psychometric 
properties, including excellent internal reliability and strong item-total correlations. 
 Convergent validity analyses provide a positive initial indication that the SCAS is 
a valid and specific measure of anxiety during public speaking. The SCAS correlated 
more strongly with a different questionnaire measure of public speaking anxiety than 
with two measures of general social anxiety. Additionally, the SCAS showed no 
mathematical relationship with a subscale measure of a construct theoretically unrelated 
to public speaking anxiety, providing evidence for discriminant validity. Contrary to 
prediction, the SCAS displayed only a small effect size of common variance with a 
measure of self-focused attention, indicating that SCAS responses in the current sample 
were not strongly influenced by attentional focus tendencies. 
 The results of the current study indicate that the SCAS may be a reliable and valid 
measure of public speaking anxiety. In comparison to other questionnaire methods of 
public speaking anxiety in wide use, the SCAS has been developed using empirical 
methods of cognitive assessment, and utilizes items adapted from self-reported cognitions 
of speech-anxious individuals. As such, the SCAS may be able to provide a more specific 
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and valid measure of public speaking anxiety than measures developed using other 
means. Furthermore, the SCAS may also be more adaptable to varying research and 
clinical contexts due to its specific focus on cognitive correlates of speaking anxiety. 
  These results are limited by the retrospective nature of sample responses, and 
further research is needed to establish the validity of the SCAS in predicting anxiety in 
actual public speaking tasks. More research is also needed to replicate the factor structure 
found in the current sample, particularly with regard to the lack of attentional focus 
elements in the factor structure of the presently obtained sample. Once the reliability and 
validity of the SCAS is more firmly established with different samples, research is 
needed to substantiate the measure‟s utility for integration with clinical and educational 
interventions for public speaking anxiety.
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Appendix A 
Final 30- Item Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale 
 This questionnaire looks at how people respond to giving a speech or presentation 
in public. Before you respond to the items in the questionnaire, take a minute and think 
back to the last several times you gave a speech in public. This could be a classroom 
presentation, at a formal occasion, or any other situation that involves you speaking 
before an audience. How did you feel as you were about to give the speech? What sort of 
things were you thinking about? While you were speaking, how did you feel during the 
speech? What thoughts were going through your head? Now, please respond to the 
following statements by indicating how well they describe your experiences when 
speaking in public. 
 
1. I feel anxious giving this speech. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
2. I look stupid to the audience. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
3. I am starting to feel uneasy. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
  
4. The audience sees that I am calm. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
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5. I am scared of this entire situation. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
6. I think I‟m doing well. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
7. They can see that I am anxious. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
8. My body feels really hot. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
9. I sound stupid talking to these people. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
10. I look confident standing up here. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
11. I am trembling standing up here. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
12. The audience can tell that I am afraid. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
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13. They think I am doing well. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
  
14. My voice sounds timid. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
15. I am doing well with the speech. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
16. This speech is making me sweat. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
17. I am panicking; I want to get out of here. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
18. I look comfortable giving this speech. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
19. I hope I don‟t look stupid in front of these people.  
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
20. I‟m going to freeze up. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
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21. I am comfortable giving this speech. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
22. They can see that I am uncomfortable. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
23. I am calm while standing in front of this audience. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
24. The speech I am giving is horrible. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
  
25. I look stiff to the audience. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
26. I am confident with my performance. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
27. This isn‟t so bad. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
28. I am uncomfortable giving this speech. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
29. I look confident to them. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
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30. The audience sees that I am doing a bad job. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
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Appendix B 
Prospective Items for Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale 
 This questionnaire looks at how people respond to giving a speech or presentation 
in public. Before you respond to the items in the questionnaire, take a minute and think 
back to the last several times you gave a speech in public. This could be a classroom 
presentation, at a formal occasion, or any other situation that involves you speaking 
before an audience. How did you feel as you were about to give the speech? What sort of 
things were you thinking about? While you were speaking, how did you feel during the 
speech? What thoughts were going through your head? Now, please respond to the 
following statements by indicating how well they describe your experiences when 
speaking in public. 
 
1. I feel anxious giving this speech. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
2. I look stupid to the audience. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
3. I am starting to feel uneasy. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
  
4. My eyes are wandering all over the room. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
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5. The audience sees that I am calm. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
6. I am scared of this entire situation. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
7. I look stiff as a board standing here. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
8. I think I‟m doing well. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
9. I hope I don‟t stutter while speaking. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
10. They can see that I am anxious. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
11. My body feels really hot. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
12. I sound stupid talking to these people. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
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13. I look confident standing up here. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
14. They think I am talking too fast. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
15. I am trembling standing up here. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
16. The audience can tell that I am afraid. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
17. They think I am doing well. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
  
18. My voice sounds timid. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
19. I am doing well with the speech. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
20. This speech is making me sweat. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
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21. I am panicking; I want to get out of here. 
 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
22. I look comfortable giving this speech. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
23. I hope I don‟t look stupid in front of these people.  
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
24. I‟m going to freeze up. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
25. I am comfortable giving this speech. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
26. They can see that I am uncomfortable. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
27. I am calm while standing in front of this audience. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
28. The speech I am giving is horrible. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
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29. I look stiff to the audience. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
30. I am confident with my performance. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
31. I keep fidgeting with my hands. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
32. This isn‟t so bad. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
33. I am uncomfortable giving this speech. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
34. I look confident to them. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
 
35. The audience sees that I am doing a bad job. 
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4 
              Never               Not in most cases, About half the time               More often                                   Always                 
but occasionally                                  than not 
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